THE DUAL PATH INITIATIVE
FRAMEWORK
ELIZABETH GARRETT* & MATHEW

D. MCCUBBINSt

I. INTRODUCTION
The widespread use of the initiative process and the perception that it
has lead to considerable negative consequences have prompted calls for
reform. In this Article, we focus on two complaints about initiatives that
can be addressed through a new legal framework.' First, some have argued
that the policy choices made through direct democracy are often not
socially optimal, and the process through which initiatives are passed may
make welfare-reducing decisions inevitable. 2 Reform proposals often aim
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1. We do not consider disclosure provisions that should be part of any initiative framework to
improve voter competence in direct democracy because these have already been the subject of more
scholarly analysis than our other proposals. For reviews of the extensive empirical literature, see, e.g.,
Elizabeth Garrett, McConnell v. FEC and Disclosure, 3 ELECTION L.J. 237 (2004); Michael S. Kang,
Democratizing Direct Democracy: Restoring Voter Competence Through Heuristic Cues and
"Disclosure Plus," 50 UCLA L. REV. 1141, 1157-59 (2003); Arthur Lupia & John G. Matsusaka,
Direct Democracy: New Approaches to Old Questions, 7 ANN. REV. POL. Sci. 463, 476-77 (2004);
Elizabeth Garrett, Commentaries on Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayers's Voting with Dollars: A New
Paradigm for Campaign Finance Reform: Voting with Cues, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 1011 passim (2003).
Similarly, we do not tackle the issue of campaign finance regulations. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen,
Rethinking the Unconstitutionality of Contribution and Expenditure Limits in Ballot Measure
Campaigns,78 S. CAL. L. REV. 885 (2005).
2.
Thad Kousser & Mathew D. McCubbins, Social Choice, Crypto-Initiatives, and
Policymaking by Direct Democracy, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 949 (2005).
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to correct this complaint by increasing the hurdles to ballot qualification.
This sort of reform is counterproductive in several ways. By increasing the
"price" of ballot access, such responses are likely to exacerbate the current
disproportionate influence of money. 3 Moreover, there is no reason to
believe that a more difficult qualification process will impede more socially
suboptimal policies than policies that are welfare-enhancing and yet
stymied in the legislature by powerful interest groups. We argue that a
better focus of initiative reform would provide other checks and balances
throughout the process, not primarily during the qualification period.
Second, initiatives, once enacted, often fail to be implemented by
government officials. 4 Few reform proposals are aimed at this postenactment problem; they do not take account of the likelihood that
government officials who resisted passing the proposal are likely to
continue to undermine it during the implementation phase. In contrast, our
framework includes a new institution to monitor compliance with popularly
generated initiatives and ensure greater enforcement. We describe these
two concerns in greater detail in Part II.
Our proposal encompasses two main reforms, each targeting one of
the two problems we identify. We propose a new comprehensive
framework that keeps both the spirit and intent of the initiative process: the
Dual Path Initiative Process with a Citizens Initiative Implementation
Oversight Commission. To construct the Dual Path Initiative Process, we
borrow from the practice in American legislatures to provide each bill three
readings on separate days.5 Our framework establishes three readings-or
distinct stages-for each initiative; these are described in Part III.
3. For a discussion of the role of money in direct democracy, see Elizabeth Garrett & Elisabeth
R. Gerber, Money in the Initiative and Referendum Process:Evidence of Its Effects and Prospectsfor
Reform, in THE BATTLE OVER CITIZEN LAWMAKING: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 73, 76-90 (M. Dane.
Waters ed., 2001); Elisabeth Gerber, Prospects for Reforming the Initiative Process (June 6, 2000)
(paper presented to the National Direct Democracy Conference, University of Virginia Center for
Government Studies), http://www.ni4d.us/library/prospects.htm.
4. ELISABETH R. GERBER, ARTHUR LUPIA, MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS & D. RODERICK KIEWIET,
STEALING THE INITIATIVE: How STATE GOVERNMENT RESPONDS TO DIRECT DEMOCRACY 15-26
(2001) [hereinafter GERBER ET AL., STEALING THE INITIATIVE]; Elisabeth R. Gerber, Arthur Lupia &
Mathew D. McCubbins, When Does Government Limit the Impact of Voter Initiatives? The Politics of
Implementation and Enforcement, 66 J. POL. 43 (2004) [hereinafter Gerber et al., The Politics of
Implementation].
5. See, e.g., RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC.
No. 108-241, §§ XXIV-XXVI (2005), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/hrm/browse_109.html
("The second reading must regularly be on another day.... [T]he question will be whether it shall be
committed, or engrossed and read a third time?"); STANDING RULES OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, S.
DOC. No. 106-15, R. XIV, 2 (2000), available at http://www.senate.gov/legislative/common/briefing/
StandingRulesSenate.htm# 14 ("Every bill and joint resolution shall receive three readings previous to
its passage which readings on demand of any Senator shall be on three different legislative days .... ");
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The first reading of the initiative occurs when only a brief description
of the proposal, providing the purpose of the initiative and the general
outline of the solution to be adopted, is circulated for signatures. This
process is designed to gauge public support for the general objective of the
proposal's backers. No legislative language need be drafted at this time;
instead, advocates of change provide a relatively brief policy statement that
sets out the essential elements of their constitutional or statutory proposal.
When sufficient signatures have been obtained and the process moves
to the second reading, there is a period of three months during which the
proponents and the legislature have the opportunity to draft legislative or
constitutional language to submit to the people for a vote. The legislature
must hold hearings on the proposal. During this second reading, lawmakers
and ballot measure proponents can negotiate so that a compromise can be
passed as a statute through the traditional legislative process, or a mutually
acceptable constitutional amendment can be submitted for a vote. Even if
there is no agreement reached, this period provides flexibility so that
drafting errors can be identified, likely consequences of the new policy can
be assessed, and language can be revised. At the end of this period, if the
proponents of change are not satisfied with the legislature's response, they
can submit to the people a detailed proposal designed to advance the
purpose of the policy statement. In essence, the second reading stage takes
advantage of the interaction between direct democracy and representative
institutions possible in the hybrid democracy that characterizes states with
the initiative and referendum processes. 6 If the legislature fails to act in a
manner acceptable to the initiative proponents, then they can place a
measure on the ballot, offering to the public a substitute for the legislature's
action (or inaction).
The third reading period occurs after an initiative-constitutional or
statutory-is enacted through a vote of the people. Popular constitutional
initiatives will expire after ten years and must be reenacted, perhaps as
amended. Constitutional provisions can be placed on the ballot for
WYO. STATE LEG., RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, R. 7-1 (2006), available at
http://legisweb.state.wy.us/2006/rules/house.htm ("Every bill shall receive three separate readings,
previous to its being passed ....
"); H.R. Res. 318, 2005 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. R. 41(a) (N.C.
2005), available at http://www.ncleg.net/house/documents/houserules.html ("Every bill shall receive
three readings in the House prior to its passage."). In reality, bills are seldom read in their entirety, and

one or two of the three readings are usually pro forma parliamentary exercises, but representative
institutions have other institutional checks that ameliorate any deliberative loss that may occur.
6.
See Elizabeth Garrett, Hybrid Democracy, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1096 (2005). A hybrid

democracy is one that incorporates both representative and direct democracy as essential elements of
lawmaking.
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reenactment in two ways: the legislature can resubmit the provision to the
people or the proponents can requalify the measure for the ballot by
meeting less onerous signature requirements. In both cases, reenactment is
permanent. Popular statutory initiatives will also be less durable because
the legislature may, after a period of time, amend or repeal any such
initiative.
Part IV describes the aspects of our proposal aimed at the
implementation problem. Our framework includes an entirely new system
for oversight of the implementation and enforcement of popular initiatives.
Here we draw on the experience with the few initiatives that have set up7
special oversight bodies, such as the Fair Political Practices Commission
or the commission overseeing the stem cell initiative passed by
Californians in 2004.8 Our framework also taps into the current enthusiasm
for increased citizen involvement in policymaking, seen in the increasing
use of initiatives over the past three decades 9 and the recent creation of a
Citizens' Assembly in British Columbia to consider and propose sweeping
reform of the system of political representation.10 We propose a Citizens
Initiative Implementation Oversight Commission ("CIIOC") to ensure that
enacted initiatives are faithfully implemented by state and local officials,
who might otherwise work to obstruct or delay implementation of ballot
measures they opposed. The CIIOC will include members named in each
successful popular initiative; it will be provided a staff and funding
sufficient to discharge its oversight function; and it will have the authority
to conduct hearings, produce reports, participate in administrative
proceedings, and even pursue litigation. The CIIOC will also be involved in
7.
CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 81000-83124 (West 2005).
8.
Proposition 71, the California Stem Cell Research and Cures Act, designated state money for
stem cell research and created a commission to oversee its disbursement. CAL. CONST. art. XXXV, §§
1-7; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 125290.10-70 (West 2006). The constitutionality of the
initiative was challenged in court by small-government and conservative religious groups, alleging that
it did not provide sufficient legislative control over the expenditure of state funds, as required by the
California Constitution. CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 3. The trial court held that the measure was
constitutional. People's Advocate v. Indep. Citizens' Oversight Comm., No. HG05 206766, HGO5
235177, 2006 WL 1417983 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 12, 2006).
9. See INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST., OVERVIEW OF INITIATIVE USE 1904-2006 (2006),
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/IRI%201nitiative%2OUse%20(2006- I1).pdf.
10. See BRITISH COLUMBIA CITIZENS' ASSEMBLY ON ELECTORAL REFORM, MAKING EVERY
VOTE COUNT: THE CASE FOR ELECTORAL REFORM IN BRITISH COLUMBIA (2004), available at

http://www.citizensassembly.bc.ca/resources/final-report.pdf. See also Heather Gerken, Op-Ed.,
Citizens Must Drive Electoral Reform, ROLL CALL, Nov. 15, 2005, at 4, available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/2005/l1/15-gerken.php. During the 2005-06 session of the
California Legislature, Assemblyman Joseph Canciamilla introduced the Citizens Assembly on
Electoral Systems Act of 2006. Assemb. Const. Amend. 28, 2005-2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006),
http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/asm/ab_0001-0050/aca_28_bill_20060125_introduced.html.
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the preelection initiative process, determining whether the initiative drafted
by proponents is consistent with the initial policy statement and providing
analysis of any legislative response. A statewide citizens oversight
commission is a novel reform, not currently used by any state. Some
individual initiatives establish special commissions to implement and
enforce the particular initiative, but we are not aware of any state that relies
on an independent body, with a staff, to investigate and enforce all popular
initiatives.
Much of our analysis is focused on California, both with regard to the
structure of the process and the examples we provide, because its initiative
process has the fewest checks and balances of any of the states with hybrid
systems. However, the Dual Path Initiative Framework, in whole or in part,
could be used by any state with popular statutory or constitutional
initiatives. Some states allow only constitutional initiatives to be proposed
by the people and thus would adopt only those parts of the framework
dealing with constitutional initiatives. Some states, as we will discuss,
already have elements of our proposal as part of their initiative process,
although none has adopted all aspects of our reform proposal. I' States
without the direct popular initiative might consider this framework to allow
an additional element of citizen involvement in lawmaking. All states with
popular initiatives face the implementation problem and should consider
adopting a reform along the lines of the oversight commission we describe.
Finally, in Part V, we conclude with a brief discussion of some aspects
of the new political equilibrium we expect after adoption of the Dual Path
Initiative Framework and the CIIOC. The two parts of hybrid democracythe initiative process and representative institutions-react to changes in
each other, and political actors alter their behavior to account for
modification in political institutions. We believe that the new equilibrium
will be an improvement over the status quo, providing checks and balances
in both parts of hybrid democracy, ensuring fuller compliance with
initiatives, and allowing for flexibility and change throughout the process
and over time to reflect both input during policy consideration and
experience as the new policy is implemented.
II. THE GOALS OF AN INITIATIVE FRAMEWORK
A central element of American democracy is checks and balances. In
Federalist 51, James Madison argued that "the constant aim is to divide
11. See infra text accompanying notes 25-26 (discussing the indirect initiative); infra text
accompanying notes 51-53 (discussing aspects of the process in Washington, Colorado, and generally).
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and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a
check on the other,"' 2 and in Federalist 47, he stated that "[t]he
accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same
hands, whether of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self
or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of
appointed,
tyranny.'"13 The numerous vetogates in the legislative process allow time
for fact-finding and deliberation, provide opportunities to correct mistakes,
and encourage compromise and change in legislative proposals to secure
passage. If a proposal manages to navigate through all the legislative
roadblocks, it still faces the possibility of a veto by the executive, and in
many states, the executive can rewrite some bills through use of a line-item
veto. Even with all these procedures, however, legislatures still enact
hastily drafted laws with errors and unexpected consequences. But the
process is constructed to guard against such bills, and if mistakes occur or
an enactment proves unworkable or unwise in practice, the legislature can
amend or repeal the bill.
As currently configured, the initiative process in California and other
initiative states lacks comparable checks. The requirement that supporters
gather signatures within a certain period of time to place an initiative on the
ballot can be an obstacle to advocates who lack access to substantial
financial or human resources. But a well-funded group is guaranteed access
to the ballot because it can hire professional firms and pay petition
circulators,' 4 and a group with a motivated and large grassroots base may
be able to gather enough signatures for ballot access, as long as it has
sufficient time for circulation. Once the measure qualifies for the ballot,
then the version submitted to a state official at the start of the petition
circulation stage appears before the voters, without any further opportunity
for amendment. Although opponents or state officials may challenge the
initiative before an election on constitutional or other legal grounds, in5
many cases, courts decline to become involved until after the election.'
12. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 263 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books 1992).
13. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 244 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books 1992).
14. See Elizabeth Garrett, Money, Agenda Setting, and Direct Democracy, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1845,
1849-54 (1999) [hereinafter Garrett, Money, Agenda Setting].
15. California courts are particularly unwilling to block initiatives from the ballot; preelection
challenges were successful only three times between 1912 and December 2002. CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE,
A HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA INITIATIVES 9 (2002), available at http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/
initjhistory.pdf. Some other states allow more preelection review. For example, in Colorado
a three-member Title Board reviews proposed initiatives to determine whether they comply
with the state's formal requirements (including, importantly, the state's so-called "single
subject rule.") The process provides an opportunity for interested parties to appeal the Title
Board's decisions to the state Supreme Court, and thus the court has a formal filtering role
prior to the election.
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The only real check on initiative lawmaking authority is the public itself,
and an initiative-whether constitutional or statutory-can be enacted in
16
most states if it receives the votes of a majority of those voting on it.
After enactment, a court may strike the initiative down if it is found to
be unconstitutional or to violate requirements such as the single subject
rule. 17 But, this check is essentially no different from what exists for
legislative lawmaking.' 8 If the judiciary does not intervene, the only way to
correct or repeal most initiatives is by enacting another initiative. In
California, the state Constitution prohibits the legislature from amending or
repealing a statutory initiative unless the initiative itself allows subsequent
legislative involvement. 19 All the other initiative states allow subsequent
legislative involvement with respect to statutory initiatives, although
sometimes only after a period of time or only by a supermajority vote. A
20
few states prohibit repeal but allow the legislature to amend the initiative.
In many states, those who wish to insulate their initiative from the
Kenneth P. Miller, The Role of Courts in the Initiative Process: A Search for Standards 1 n.3 (Sept. 2-5,
1999) (working paper, delivered at the 1999 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association), http://www.iandrinstitute.org/Studies.htm; COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 1-40-106 to -107 (2006).
Like courts in most states, however, those in Colorado are more willing to strike down an initiative at
this stage on procedural grounds than substantive ones. See Miller, supra, at I n.3. See also Advisory
Op. to the Att'y Gen. Re: Indep. Nonpartisan Comm'n to Apportion Leg. and Cong. Dists. Which
Replaces Apportionment by Leg., 926 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 2006) (responding to a request by the attorney
general and removing an initiative on reapportionment from the ballot because it violated the single
subject requirement).
16. See M. DANE WATERS, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ALMANAC 26 (2003).
17. Between 1960 and 1999, fifty-five initiatives were adopted in California, thirty-six of which
were challenged in court. As of September 1999, final judgment had been rendered with respect to
thirty-two initiatives. Of those, fourteen were upheld (44%), eleven were invalidated in part (34%), and
seven were invalidated in their entirety (22%). The courts therefore invalidated, at least in part, about
33% of the initiatives enacted in California between 1960 and September 1999. Miller, supra note 15, at
12.
18. All legislation can be attacked in court on constitutional grounds, and many state legislatures
are subject to single subject requirements. See Brannon P. Denning & Brooks R. Smith, Uneasy Riders:
The Case for a Truth-in-LegislationAmendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 957 app. A. Some commentators,
however, have observed that courts may more rigorously apply single subject rules to direct legislation
than traditionally enacted laws. See In re Title and Ballot Title and Submission Clause for 2005-2006
#55, 138 P.3d 273, 283 (Colo. 2006) (en bane) (Coats, J., dissenting) ("Although the majority opinion
today pays homage to the [single subject] requirement's dual concerns for secreting unrelated
provisions and combining provisions too unpopular to succeed on their own, it understands the term
'subject' to be so elastic as to give this court unfettered discretion to either approve or disapprove
virtually any popularly-initiated ballot measure at will."); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P.
FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE

CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 511 (3d ed. 2001) (discussing California's single subject rule).
19. CAL. CONST. art. I1,§ 10(c).
20. See WATERS, supranote 16, at 27 (providing state-specific details); infra notes 72-73.
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21
possibility of legislative tinkering can use the constitutional initiative.
Constitutional initiatives can be changed only through another vote of the
people.

Another significant difference between representative and direct
lawmaking involves the scope of the decisions that are made. Legislators
can debate and amend statutes before enacting them, and they can
deliberate and compromise over a proposed statute. Even legislatures
governed by single subject requirements can alter the details of any bill,
and the institutional arrangements in representative bodies allow
lawmakers to bargain across several bills to facilitate compromise. Direct
lawmaking is far more rigid: voters are presented with a binary choice on a
policy-either to accept it or retain the status quo-and logrolling across
initiatives is impossible, as is meaningful deliberation or debate among
voters. Within the legislature, policymakers are better able to consider
tradeoffs in state budget decisions; in contrast, the initiative process is
susceptible to the pathologies of "sequential elimination agendas." 22 When
people are asked to choose between alternatives over time without the
opportunity to compare among the many alternatives directly, they cannot
measures
consider tradeoffs and are "almost certain to pass contradictory 23
that have deleterious economic, social, or political consequences."
Our first set of recommendations for the Dual Path Initiative Process
therefore seeks to add appropriate checks into the initiative process. We
21. See WATERS, supra note 16, at 12 (providing a table showing states with constitutional
initiatives, statutory initiatives, or both).
22. See Kousser & McCubbins, supra note 2, at 963-66. Our proposal does not change the
binary, sequential nature of the U.S. initiative process, although other formats for decisionmaking are
possible. See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Who Chooses the Rules?, 4 ELECTION L.J. 139, 145-46 (2005)
[hereinafter Garrett, Who Chooses the Rules?] (describing a two-stage, multiple choice format used in
New Zealand). However, our proposal requiring constitutional initiatives to expire and allowing
subsequent legislative involvement with statutory ones will mitigate the welfare-reducing consequences
of this decisionmaking pathology. See infra Part 1I.C.
23. Kousser & McCubbins, supra note 2, at 965-66. The structure of direct democracypresenting a series of questions on single subjects for a "yes" or "no" vote-impedes any
straightforward consideration of tradeoffs and tends to obscure the tradeoffs that must necessarily be
made in these decisions. Voters are not offered tradeoffs directly, which implies the tradeoffs are not in
their choice set and thus would be difficult or impossible to consider. Furthermore, in many states that
apply a single subject rule to initiatives, voters are forbidden from considering tradeoffs. A considerable
amount of scholarship has determined that voters do not consider tradeoffs unless they are squarely
presented with them. See, e.g., V.0. KEY, JR., PUBLIC OPINION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 205-87
(1964); Jack Citrin, Do People Want Somethingfor Nothing: Public Opinion on Taxes and Government
Spending, 32 NAT'L TAX J. (SUPP.) 113 (1979); James H. Kuklinski, Paul J. Quirk, Jennifer Jerit &
Robert F. Rich, The PoliticalEnvironment and Citizen Competence, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 410 (2001);
Andre Modigliani & Franco Modigliani, The Growth of the Federal Deficit and the Role of Public
Attitudes, 51 PUB. OPINION Q. 459 (1987).

2007)

DUAL PATH INITIATIVE FRAMEWORK

proceed from a very different starting point than most initiative reformers.
Many other reformers work to increase the initial hurdles to ballot access;
for example, they often advocate increasing signature thresholds.2 4 In our
view, raising the costs of obtaining a vote further tilts the playing field in
favor of moneyed interests and away from grassroots majoritarian interests
seeking to use the process as it was intended to operate. Our preference is
to leave the ability to begin the initiative process unchanged-indeed, make
the process somewhat easier by requiring only a policy statement and not
text before petitions can be circulated-and to include more checks and
balances in the process after qualification. In that way, groups and
individuals with proposals stymied in the legislature can use direct
democracy to seek a place on the agenda, but any policy that results is more
likely to improve social welfare.
Other reformers have suggested that California eliminate the direct
initiative and replace it with a traditional indirect initiative. The indirect
initiative currently exists in nine states for either constitutional
amendments, statutes, or both.25 The indirect initiative process allows the
legislature a formal role in the process before any measure is submitted to
the public. Generally, the legislature is required to hold hearings on an
initiative that has gained a certain number of signatures, and legislators
must vote on the proposal. In some states, the legislature may amend the
initiative; in others, the legal framework requires lawmakers to take an upor-down vote on the initiative as presented by proponents. Usually in the
indirect initiative process, if the legislature enacts the proposed initiativeor, in some states, enacts a law substantially the same as the proposal-the
question does not appear on the ballot. If the legislature refuses to act, the
measure is submitted to the people. In a few states, supporters are required
to obtain additional signatures to move past the legislature to the people
24.

See, e.g., Elisabeth R. Gerber, Reforming the California Initiative Process: A Proposal to

Increase Flexibility and Legislative Accountability, in CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN CALIFORNIA 291,

303 (Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll eds., 1995) (recommending increasing the signature threshold for
constitutional initiatives as part of a larger reform proposal with elements of indirect initiatives); Mark
Ridley-Thomas & Erwin Chemerinsky, Editorial, Now That It's Finally Over, Let's Revamp the Recall,

L.A. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2003, at BI5. But see John Ferejohn, Reforming the Initiative Process, in
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN CALIFORNIA, supra, at 313, 315 (proposing that once an initiative has
qualified, competing initiatives on the same topic could qualify with fewer signatures).
25.
For a discussion of the variations on the indirect initiative, see CAL. COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN
FIN., DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE: SHAPING CALIFORNIA'S FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 104-05,
117 (unz.org 2003) (1992) [hereinafter DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE]. Fewer states allow the indirect
initiative than the direct initiative; two states have an indirect constitutional initiative process, and nine
have an indirect statutory initiative process. See Fred Silva, The IndirectInitiative Process, in WATERS,
supra note 16, at 13-15.
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even if the legislature does nothing. In other states, the supporters' version
is placed on the ballot alongside any legislative version that is different.
Although our Dual Path Initiative Process is influenced by the indirect
initiative, simply requiring all states to offer only the indirect initiative as
currently configured is an unrealistic reform proposal. California had the
indirect initiative until 1966, and it was seldom used.26 Given the public's
strong support for the direct initiative, it is unlikely that voters would
accede to a reform that replaces the well-liked direct initiative with the
scorned indirect one. Instead, we opt to keep the direct initiative, but we
add characteristics of the indirect initiative process that might eliminate the
need in some cases to take the measure to the people for a vote. Under the
Dual Path Initiative Process, initiative proponents remain in the driver's
seat; they decide whether the legislature's response is sufficient to
ameliorate their concerns or whether they will draft legislative or
constitutional language and submit their policy change to the people. Our
new framework nonetheless adds checks and balances to the current
initiative process that are aimed either to eliminate the problems we have
identified or to mitigate their consequences. The latter occurs because of
the third reading of the framework, which requires popular constitutional
initiatives to be reauthorized and allows legislative involvement with all
popular statutory initiatives. The durability of popular change is thereby
reduced relative to the status quo.
By itself, the addition of such checks and balances to the initiative
process would do much to improve the process. But how valuable are
initiatives if they remain unimplemented and subverted, which is often the
outcome now? The people vote to enact policy, but then they return to their
lives, assuming that government officials will follow their directions. They
do not have the ability, or often the interest, to monitor implementation by
the executive branch, sometimes with involvement of the legislature.
Because elected officials often opposed the policy put into place by direct
democracy, they are not likely to eagerly or aggressively work to follow the
public mandate.
As a matter of fact, those in charge of implementation are often the
very agents the initiative was designed to control. For example, the
initiative might enact sweeping reform of the education system, which must
then be implemented by the Department of Education, school
administrators, and teachers. Or the initiative might enact public financing
26.

DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE, supra note 25, at 47 & n.43.
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27
of state campaigns, but the legislature has to appropriate money for it.
There is ample reason to worry that these lawmakers and administrators
will not enthusiastically implement the policies they refused to adopt.2 8 In a
way, this is the opposite of the problem identified before-rather than too
few vetogates, which characterizes the process of proposing and enacting
initiatives, there are too many checks standing in the way of effective
implementation and most of those are controlled by officials who are likely
hostile to the reform.

When courts strike down initiatives and block their implementation,
they justify their action because the popular law is unconstitutional or in
some other way legally flawed. The people cannot get what they want
because their desires conflict with larger principles and values, such as
individual rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution. But when state
officials block initiatives by surreptitiously undermining them, they follow
their own preferences rather than those of the voters, and they do so in
ways designed to reduce accountability. Gerber, Lupia, McCubbins, and
Kiewiet have found that certain conditions allow government officials to
undermine or ignore initiatives more easily.29 First, substantial technical or
political costs will lead to lower levels of compliance because the net value
of implementation is reduced. Second, if implementers face significant
sanctions for noncompliance, they are more likely to work to effectively
implement the initiative. Third, when it is easier for the public or others
who support the initiative to observe compliance, it is more likely that
officials will comply. Finally, "[u]nder normal conditions, as the number of
people required for full compliance increases, the likelihood of full
compliance goes to zero." 30 A new framework for initiatives could increase
the likelihood of substantial compliance with initiatives by changing some
of these conditions. Our proposed CIIOC improves monitoring and can
27.

It has been suggested to us that, rather than using an enforcement commission, we should just

urge initiative writers to put clear enforcement standards into the language of the initiative, such as
reporting requirements and strict penalties for noncompliance. GERBER ET AL., STEALING THE
INITIATIVE, supra note 4, at 22-25. These are all good ideas, but the problem is that they do not answer
the questions: To whom is the legislature supposed to report? Who decides if a sanction is to be
imposed, and, if imposed, who decides the remedy and the penalized party? Who then enforces the

enforcement? The CIIOC will be able to determine if the initiative has been implemented or not and can
bring to bear the only enforcements possible or necessary, that is, court or electoral sanctions to those
who have impeded the implementation of an initiative. The CIIOC will be in a position to bring to the

public's attention the lack of enforcement of an initiative, and it will be up to the public to decide if it is
a wrong that is worth righting through the ballot box.
28.
Gerber et al., The Politics of Implementation, supra note 4, at 52-56.
29.
GERBER ET AL., STEALING THE INITIATIVE, supra note 4, at 20-25. See also Lupia &
Matsusaka, supranote 1,at 475-76 (discussing scholarship on the "implementation problem").
30.
GERBER ET AL., STEALING THE INITIATIVE, supranote 4, at 24.
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better ensure that there are sanctions, political and legal, for
noncompliance. It thus responds to the first three conditions identified
above.
Although one response to the problems in the initiative process is to
eliminate direct democracy, we do not advocate that path. First, we do not
believe it is realistic. Polls consistently demonstrate that citizens like the
initiative process and trust its outcomes more than they trust legislation
enacted by their representatives. 3 Because sweeping changes to the
initiative process require constitutional amendment, the people will be
involved in any reform, and they are unlikely to get rid of initiatives
altogether. Polls suggest, however, that reforms along the lines of our three
readings proposal-at least the first two stages-would be viewed
32
favorably by many Californians.
Second, we view a properly constructed initiative process as a
necessary component of a well-functioning democracy because it provides
a way around the conflicts of interest that legislators possess with regard to
some matters of institutional structure. Often lawmakers themselves
determine the rules of democracy (for example, in enacting campaign
finance laws or in establishing electoral districts). Under such
circumstances, there is the well-founded concern that self-interest will
prevail over the public interest and that rules will be chosen to entrench the
already powerful, decrease competition from the outside, and silence new
voices. 33 Thus, one advantage of hybrid democracy is that it allows the
people a formalized role in institutional design decisions.
31.
See, e.g., MARK BALDASSARE, PPIC STATEWIDE SURVEY AUGUST 2004: CALIFORNIANS
AND THEIR GOVERNMENT 17 (2004) (stating that 74% of California residents think the initiative
process is a "good thing" and 59% believe that policy decisions made by voters through initiatives are
probably better than policy decisions made by elected officials); Jack Citrin & Jonathan Cohen, Viewing
the Recallfrom Above and Below, in ESSAYS ON THE CALIFORNIA RECALL 68, 74-82 (Shaun Bowler &
Bruce E. Cain eds., 2006) (citing several recent polls confirming California's strong and increasing
support of direct legislation). Even after the 2005 special election in California, in which voters rejected
all the initiatives, Californians are still enthusiastic about direct democracy. See MARK BALDASSARE,
PPIC STATEWIDE SURVEY NOVEMBER 2005: SPECIAL SURVEY ON CALIFORNIANS AND THE INITIATIVE
PROCESS 13 (2005) [hereinafter BALDASSARE, SPECIAL ELECTION POLL] (stating that nearly half (48%)
of voters in the November 2005 special election said that public policies generated by the initiative
process are probably better than those developed by the governor and legislature; only three in ten
thought the voters' decisions are probably worse).
32.
BALDASSARE, SPECIAL ELECTION POLL, supra note 31, at 17 (stating that 77% of special
election voters favored creating a new system of review and revision of proposed initiatives to avoid
legal issues and drafting errors; 83% favored allowing time for the legislature and the proponents to
reach a compromise before initiatives can be presented on the ballot).
33.
Given the inherent conflicts of interest faced by lawmakers in designing the rules that will
shape their careers, even some who have substantial reservations about the initiative process
nonetheless argue that more directly involving the people in decisionmaking about democratic
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Similarly, the initiative process can provide a majoritarian escape
valve if the legislative process is captured by special interests. The absence
of checks and balances in the initiative process reduces the influence of

minority interests with strong preferences that can use legislative vetogates
to block policies they oppose or force compromise to gain special benefits.
Even though the agenda of direct democracy tends to be determined by
well-funded groups who can use paid signature gatherers to assure ballot
access, policy is enacted only when it can obtain majority approval on
election day. Thus, the majoritarian initiative process can provide a
counterbalance to the legislative process; indeed, the presence of a robust
initiative process may change the output from the traditional legislature so
that it enacts policies closer to the median voter's preference. 34 Thus, we
believe complete elimination of direct democracy is not warranted-the

better answer is to improve the initiative process.
III. A FRAMEWORK TO PROVIDE CHECKS AND BALANCES IN
THE INITIATIVE PROCESS: A DUAL PATH INITIATIVE PROCESS

Our reforms allow initiatives to continue to play a necessary role to
check the self-interest of legislators in the arena of government reform and
to circumvent the power of well-funded, organized groups who block
policy favored by a majority. We do not favor unchecked populism,
however. Our goal is to strengthen both the initiative process and

representative institutions, and we believe meeting that objective requires a
institutions is justified. See, e.g., DENNIS F. THOMPSON, JUST ELECTIONS: CREATING A FAIR
ELECTORAL PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES 14 (2002); Dennis F. Thompson, The Role of Theorists
and Citizens in Just Elections: A Response to Professors Cain, Garrett,and Sabl, 4 ELECTION L.J. 153,
158-60 (2005). For a less guarded advocacy of direct democracy to design democratic institutions, see
Garrett, Who Chooses the Rules?, supra note 22. Whether the initiative process actually leads to
different electoral institutions is a matter of scholarly contention. Compare Nathaniel Persily & Melissa
Cully Anderson, Regulating Democracy Through Democracy: The Use of Direct Legislation in Election
Law Reform, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 997 (2005) (finding the initiative process related to states' adopting
nonpartisan redistricting commissions, legislative term limits, and public financing for legislative
races), with John G. Matsusaka, Direct Democracy and Electoral Reform, in THE MARKETPLACE OF
DEMOCRACY: ELECTORAL COMPETITION AND AMERICAN POLITICS (Michael P. McDonald & John
Samples eds., 2006) (finding that the initiative has little effect on electoral laws except for the adoption
of legislative term limits).
34.
See JOHN G. MATSUSAKA, FOR THE MANY OR THE FEW: THE INITIATIVE, PUBLIC POLICY,
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 83-92 (2004) (discussing the various "frictions" that cause
representatives to get out of step with their constituents); Elisabeth R. Gerber, Legislative Response to
the Threat of PopularInitiatives, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 99, 107-17 (1996) (analyzing when and how the
legislature will be constrained by the threat of initiatives); John G. Matsusaka, Direct Democracy
Works, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2005, at 185, 192 (2005) ("Since ballot propositions are filtered through
the electorate, only policies that make the median voter better off can gain approval in an election or
credibly threaten the legislature.").
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fundamental restructuring of the popular initiative process. Our reform
package would itself require a vote of the people to be adopted as an
amendment to the state constitution.3 5 Figure 1 on the following page
presents a graphical representation of the first set of reforms we propose,
dubbed the Dual Path Initiative Process.
35. In California, it could be argued that our package of reforms is a revision of the California
Constitution, rather than an amendment, because it alters the power of the electors in the initiative
process through the three readings framework and alters the power of the legislature through the
oversight commission. Constitutional revision cannot be done through the initiative process but can be
done by the legislature, if two-thirds of each house votes to put the revision on the ballot, or by
constitutional convention. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 1-3. Courts have defined what constitutes a
revision rather than an amendment, but the line between the two is not clear. See, e.g., Legislature v.
Eu, 816 P.2d 1309, 1319 (Cal. 1991) (finding that an initiative that imposed legislative term limits and
other reforms was an amendment, because it did not "necessarily or inevitably appearfrom [its]
face.., that the measure [would] substantially alter the basic governmental framework set forth in our
Constitution"); McFadden v. Jordan, 196 P.2d 787, 799 (Cal. 1948) (finding that a wide-ranging
initiative that, among other things, created a Pension Commission would "substantially alter the purpose
and ... attain objectives clearly beyond the lines of the Constitution as now cast" and thus constituted a
revision). Given the restructuring we propose, it is possible our framework would be considered a
revision in California; in which case, it should originate in the legislature. We believe, however, that
our framework does not effect such "far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan"
to necessarily rise to the level of revision. Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 583 P.2d 1281, 1286 (Cal. 1978). We do not know if similar issues would be raised in
other states considering reform along the same lines we suggest.
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A. THE FIRST READING OF AN INITIATIVE: QUALIFYING A GENERAL
POLICY STATEMENT

When citizens sign a petition to put an initiative on the ballot, few, if
any, spend time reading the actual text and considering the details of the
proposal. At most, they make their decision on the basis of the objective of
the initiative. 36 Do they want the state to play a larger role in funding stem
cell research? Are they unhappy with the current laws regulating parental
notification in the case of minors seeking an abortion? Should the state
establish more community mental health services and pay for them with a
tax on millionaires? In many cases, citizens decide whether to sign a
petition on the basis of who is advocating the change. Do they tend to favor
policies put forward by insurance companies? Are they sympathetic to the
goals of the Sierra Club? Of course, many are willing to sign anything
pushed in front of them on their way in to shop at Costco or Wal-Mart, and
they are sometimes willing to sign several petitions at one time, without
even knowing the subject matter of the measures. They simply want to get
past the petition circulator and have no objection to anything being placed
on the ballot. After all, they do not have to vote for it.
Given the reality of the signature gathering phase, there is no benefit
to requiring that legislative or constitutional language be included with the
petitions at this stage in the process. All citizens need is a brief,
straightforward description of the policy supported by the proponents and a
clear identification of the major groups behind the signature drive. This
policy statement represents the first reading period in Figure 1. We propose
that at the ballot qualification stage, initiative advocates submit a policy
36. We know of no direct evidence revealing how voters decide to sign initiative petitions. We
note, however, that every state provides a brief summary of the ballot initiative on the petition. In
addition, voters generally do not know much about public policy when asked. Taken together, these
realities suggest that most voters are unlikely to know much about policy specifics and may often
decide only on the basis of general policy goals. It may be the case that many voters are not even aware
of the general policy objectives when they sign petitions, perhaps signing because they want to end the
interaction with the signature gatherer and get on with their shopping, because they believe any
question should be posed to voters, without coming to a conclusion about the merits, or because they
believe their interests are aligned with those groups coordinating the petition drive and therefore they do
not need to know more about the measure's substance. These voters would be made no worse off by our
proposal; very few voters will find themselves denied information they need to make the decision
whether to sign a petition or not. Literature on general voter ignorance is copious. See, e.g., ANGUS
CAMPBELL, PHILIP E. CONVERSE, WARREN E. MILLER & DONALD E. STOKES, THE AMERICAN VOTER
(1960); MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT POLITICS
AND WHY IT MATTERS (1996); Larry M. Bartels, Homer Gets a Tax Cut: Inequality and Public Policy
in the American Mind, 3 PERSP. ON POL. 15 (2005); Larry M. Bartels, Uninformed Votes: Information
Effects in PresidentialElections, 40 AM.. POL. SCI. 194 (1996).
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statement of no more than 500 words. Although the statement can be
generally phrased, proponents will have an incentive to provide clear
information about all major pieces of their proposal because, in later stages
of the process, the legislative or constitutional language they develop will
be measured against this policy statement. Material in the final version of
the initiative that is not fairly encompassed by the initial statement will be
stricken from the text presented to voters. The standard used to assess
whether particular text is consistent with the policy statement is one of
reasonable notice: Did the formulation provide notice of this aspect of the
measure to a reasonable citizen asked to sign the petition? If not, would
that citizen consider this a material aspect of the policy or merely a
reasonable means of implementing the objective that had been clearly
described?
Because the second reading period allows drafters to change their
proposal to reflect new information and encourages negotiations with the
legislature or other groups, the policy statement should be drafted so that it
can encompass a proposal that may be somewhat different from the original
vision. The statement must contain some specifics, however, both to
provide voters enough sense of the proposal to decide whether to sign the
petition and to meaningfully shape the second reading period. We suggest
that each policy statement follow the outline of the Mischief Rule set out in
Heydon's Case,37 one of the classic statutory interpretation cases. A
legislative act involves describing the status quo, identifying the "mischief
and defect" in the status quo, providing a "remedy" to solve the defect, and
determining its benefits and any costs. Over time this format will become
familiar to voters so they can quickly grasp the import of any petition being
circulated.
So, for example, a policy statement in the area of legislative
redistricting could describe the absence of competition because of partisan
and bipartisan gerrymanders, argue that this reality reduces electoral
choices and undermines the responsiveness of lawmakers to voters, identify
nonpartisan redistricting commissions as the solution because they remove
some of the partisanship from the redistricting process, and provide an
estimate of any costs relative to the status quo. Drafters would want to
provide enough information so that voters would have a relatively clear
sense of the reform being proposed, but allow enough flexibility to refine
and change the proposal during the second reading phase. Language that
37.
Heydon's Case, (1584) 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (Exch.). See also LAWRENCE E. FILSON, THE
LEGISLATIVE DRAFTER'S DESK REFERENCE 29-51 (1992) (describing a similar kind of approach to
drafting statutes, that is, identify the problem and choose a solution from policy alternatives).
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generally identifies a nonpartisan redistricting commission as a solution
postpones to the second reading period the determination of whether that
commission will consist of judges, citizens, or people appointed by
political officials. Although drafters could specify one of these models in
the policy statement, they would not need to. Indeed, further specification
could rule out possible compromises during negotiations in the second
reading period. If voters who signed the general policy statement disagree
with the drafters' ultimate choice-for example, voters prefer citizens
commissions and the drafters decide to use judges-they can defeat the
proposal at the polls.
The signature thresholds and time to gather signatures would remain
unchanged from current law. It is not the number of signatures or the length
of time provided for petition circulation we object to; rather, we want to
provide only necessary information to those who sign the petitions while
allowing proponents time during the next stage to develop the details of the
initiative's text that will implement their policy objectives. Thus, unlike
other reform proposals focused on making ballot access more difficult, the
framework we propose does not increase the "price" of qualifying
initiatives for the ballot, which would further amplify the role of money in
the process. 38 Instead, the new process may somewhat reduce the costs of
qualifying a ballot measure, because fewer resources would be required to
draft this sort of a statement. Any reduction in costs is likely to be
relatively minimal, however, because most of the expense of qualifying a
ballot measure is in the form of payment for petition circulators, an expense
that remains unchanged. Thus, our framework does not eliminate the
influence of money in the qualification stage; presumably, well-funded
groups and individuals will still find it relatively easy to qualify policy
statements as long as they can pay signature gatherers, and they will use
their resources to frame their policy statements so they motivate people to
39
sign petitions.
38.

See supra note 3 and accompanying text.

39. To get an initiative on the ballot in California, the cost has been estimated at "anywhere from
one to two million dollars," a substantial chunk of which goes to paying petition circulators. DAVID S.
BRODER, DEMOCRACY DERAILED: INITIATIVE CAMPAIGNS AND THE POWER OF MONEY 69, 72 (2000).
Eliminating paid petition circulators is not an option under current constitutional jurisprudence. Meyer

v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 423-24 (1988). There might be, however, some flexibility to regulate how they
are paid. See ANDREW M. GLOGER, INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST., REP. 2006-1, PAID PETITIONERS
AFTER PRETE (2006), http://law.usc.edu/academics/assets/docs/PaidPetitionersafterPrete.pdf.
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1. Emphasizing Policy Objectives over Detailed Language
There are at least two disadvantages to the current system of requiring
a formal text of the initiative at the petition circulation stage; we eliminate
both. First, presently the legislative or constitutional text is emphasized at
the beginning of the initiative process, even though the actual language
plays little role in citizens' decision to sign petitions. In California,
proponents must submit the text of the initiative to the secretary of state to
obtain permission to begin gathering signatures. The attorney general then
drafts a title and summary, which are typically relatively legalistic in
tone. 40 All of this information-title, official summary, and text-are
provided with the petition. 4 1 In contrast, our proposal focuses attention on
writing an easily understood description of the general policy objective
behind the initiative and providing voters a sense of the interests funding
the petition circulation effort.42 The attorney general will still provide a title
for the policy statement that would appear on petitions and the ballot, but
no official summary is required at this stage.
One might object to circulating only a general policy statement,
because it somehow undermines the validity of signatures. Citizens who
sign the petition, the argument goes, want a particular statutory or
constitutional proposal placed on the ballot; if the proponents can later
develop the text of that proposal without somehow clearing it with the
hundreds of thousands of signers, then there is no way to be certain that the
voters who signed the petition would still favor putting this measure on the
ballot. We find this argument unpersuasive. The details of a ballot measure
play virtually no role in the decision to sign a petition. Moreover, in the
end, the ballot measure becomes law only if it receives a majority vote. If
those who signed the petitions accompanied by the general policy
statement no longer support the initiative because they view the text
presented to them as inconsistent with the original objective, they can vote
against it. Most initiatives fail to pass, 43 and voters tend to vote "no" when
they are uncertain or worried about the effect of an initiative. We expect
that one issue in any initiative campaign under our framework will be
40.

"In providing the ballot title, the Attorney General shall give a true and impartial statement of

the purpose of the measure in such language that the ballot title shall neither be an argument, nor be
likely to create prejudice, for or against the proposed measure." CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9051 (West 2003).
41.
Id. §§ 9008, 9011.
42.
We do not discuss this disclosure requirement at length. See Garrett, Money, Agenda Setting,
supra note 14, at 1884-86 (providing a fuller discussion of disclosure statutes).
43.
See WATERS, supra note 16, at 7. The rates at which popular initiatives pass vary among the
states. For example, 68% of initiatives in Florida passed between 1976 and 2000, while only 35% of

initiatives passed in California from 1912 until 2000. Id. at 174, 93.
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whether the text presented to the voters conforms to the policy statement
that was circulated. Voters will, therefore, have ample opportunity to
punish any opportunistic behavior. We note that one positive development
from our new framework may be clearer drafting of the legislative or
constitutional text so that initiative supporters will be able to credibly claim
to voters that they are acting consistently with the policy objectives they
identified generally during the first reading stage.
2. Allowing Flexibility in Drafting
Second, in all states with the popular initiative, once the text of the
statutory or constitutional proposal has been submitted to the relevant state
official to obtain permission to circulate petitions, virtually no changes are
allowed." The current initiative process is a rigid one, unforgiving of
mistakes and not amenable to compromise and revision during the
campaign period. A recent case in California demonstrates this rigidity. In
the fall 2005 special election, the legislative redistricting initiative
supported by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger was nearly removed from
the ballot when it was learned that supporters had submitted one version to
the secretary of state and circulated petitions with another version.
Although supporters argued that the differences were minor and technical,
the attorney general went to court to remove the measure from the Special
election ballot. The California Supreme Court allowed the initiative to
remain on the ballot, ruling tersely that there had been no showing that the
people who signed the initiative had been misled.4 5 In the final decision
after the initiative's defeat, the California Supreme Court held that the
proposition was properly submitted to the voters, notwithstanding the
discrepancies, because the voters would not have been misled about the
initiative if they relied on the version that did not appear on the ballot.46 It
seems clear that if the proponents had purposefully made changes in the
initiative after it was submitted to state officials at the beginning of the
circulation process-even if the changes were to correct mistakes-or if
44. States with the direct initiative process prohibit changes in the text of the proposal after a
very early stage in the process. Although some allow revisions to reflect advice provided by legislative
drafters or other officials, see, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 34-1809(l)(a)-(b) (2006), none allow changes
once proponents begin to circulate petitions. In some indirect initiative processes, the proposal can be
changed after the legislature has considered it and refused to act but before it is presented to the citizens
for a vote. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. art. XLVIII, § 2, cl. V (allowing a change that is "perfecting in its
nature and does not materially change the substance of the measure").
45.
46.

Costa v. Super. Ct., 128 P.3d 149 (Cal. 2005), rev'd, 128 P.3d 675 (Cal. 2006).
Costa v. Super. Ct., 128 P.3d 675, 700 (Cal. 2006).
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the discrepancies had not been relatively minor,4 7 the petitions would have
been invalid, and the measure pulled off the ballot. In contrast, our
framework contemplates that such substantial changes could be made after
the policy statement qualifies because a process providing such flexibility
is a better process than the rigid status quo. The California Supreme
Court's reaction is noteworthy for our purposes for another reason: the
Court's view of the signature gathering process mirrors ours in that the
justices did not believe the details of the proposal played a significant role
in a citizen's decision to sign the petition.
Our Dual Path Initiative Framework allows proponents to take a
general policy proposal to the people through the petition process. Once
initiative backers get sufficient signatures, they earn the right to move into
the stage of second reading. Essentially, they have earned an option to
place an initiative on the ballot to implement the policy statement. In the
second reading period, the proposal's language is drafted in a process that
allows major as well as minor revisions, and the legislature plays a role in
the process, a role that can be substantial if lawmakers decide to negotiate
with proponents or put their own proposal on the ballot.
B. THE SECOND READING: DRAFTING THE TEXT AND NEGOTIATING WITH
THE LEGISLATURE

As is evident in Figure 1, there are two pathways through which an
initiative can influence public policy. First, once a proposal has met the
signature requirement, a three-month period will begin during which the
proponents of the proposal can develop text to implement the policy
objectives.48 Second, the legislature can submit text on the same general
topic or otherwise reach a compromise that satisfies proponents.4 9
No other group can submit an initiative related to this policy statement
for the ballot, although presumably some competing groups may also
47. Id. (calling discrepancies between the version of the initiative measure submitted to the
attorney general and the version circulated for signature "inadvertent"); id. at 694 (referring to
"numerous relatively minor departures" from constitutional and statutory requirements that still
substantially comply with applicable provisions).
48. Another recent scholarly proposal includes a step in the initiative process similar to ours. It
would also allow flexibility in drafting after qualification and would provide a preelection period
similar to notice-and-comment rulemaking in federal administrative agencies. This process would allow
better drafting and time for compromise; it would also provide a record for subsequent judicial review.
See Glen Staszewski, The Bait-and-Switch in Direct Democracy, 2006 Wis. L. REv. 17, 55-59.

49. Because the legislature has a role in this process, the three months must overlap with a
legislative session, a requirement that presents greater logistical challenges in states with part-time
legislatures.
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qualify their own general statements of policy as a response to a petition
drive. In many cases, developing competing ballot measures is a strategy to
defeat the first one; the competitors may not particularly care if their
measure is enacted because their main objective is to defeat the proposal
they oppose. In 2005, for example, pharmaceutical companies used this
tactic to defeat a measure placed on the California ballot by consumer
groups to provide discounts on prescription drugs. 50 The main goal of
qualifying the second measure was to defeat the first; thus, the drug
companies were not very disappointed when both failed. In other cases,
competing groups simply have different ways of achieving the same goal.
In this case, either both would have to qualify policy statements to get their
versions on the ballot, or they would have to compromise during the second
reading period on text that fits the policy statement that has qualified and
proceed to the ballot with a consensus proposal. To allow voters to more
easily understand the relationship among ballot measures, related
measures-whether put on the ballot by the legislature or by another group
that qualified a competing policy statement-should be grouped together
on the ballot and identified in a way that allows voters to see them as
linked.
Early in the second reading period, proponents will post proposed text
on a state website to elicit suggestions, amendments, and discussion. This
text need not be the final text but rather a proposal that is likely to change
during this stage of the process. In addition, the legislature will be required
to hold hearings in both houses on the proposal. Initiative proponents
should have access to state-provided services to assist in drafting effective
legislative language. Some states currently provide such services. For
example, Washington's code reviser is required to review all initiative
proposals and provide advice to sponsors on form and language; indeed, if
the sponsor merely submits a memo sketching out the objective and
51
proposal, the staff of the code reviser will draft the legislative language.
50. Proposition 78 on the 2005 special election ballot was sponsored by the pharmaceutical
companies and would have created a state-run drug discount program in which the pharmaceutical
companies could voluntarily participate. Proposition 78: Discounts on Prescription Drugs. Initiative
Statute, reprinted in OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE: SPECIAL STATEWIDE ELECTION, 36-41,

66-69 (Cal. Sec'y of State, 2005), available at http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/bp.nov05/voter info_
pdf/entire78.pdf. It was a reaction to Proposition 79, which was sponsored by consumer groups such as
Consumers Union, AARP, and the League of Women Voters, and would have created a mandatory drug
discount program. Proposition 79: Prescription Drug Discounts, reprinted in OFFICIAL VOTER
INFORMATION GUIDE: SPECIAL STATEWIDE ELECTION, 42-49, 69-72 (Cal. Sec'y of State, 2005),
available at http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/bp-nov05/voter infopdf/entire79.pdf.
51.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29A.72.020 (LexisNexis 2006). See DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE,
supra note 25, at 102.
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In Colorado, there is a mandatory public hearing on measures that will
appear on the ballot,5 2 and the advice provided by experts and the public

during this deliberation results in revisions in seventy to eighty percent of
initiatives before petitions are circulated.53 These review periods all occur
before the petition circulation stage; our framework would change that
timing so that drafting and legislative resources are deployed only after a
significant number of voters have indicated a desire to submit the policy to
a popular vote.
Qualifying a policy statement in the first reading period can be viewed
as just a new way to introduce a bill into the legislative process. Once
proponents gather the required number of signatures, they begin a process
that involves legislative hearings and the possibility of negotiation with
other groups and the legislature. Just as with a bill introduced in the
traditional manner, the legislature may choose not to act, or it may revise
the proposal significantly. Unlike other bills, however, the initiative
proponents can choose to take their reform to the people for enactment if
they are not satisfied with the legislative response. Given this difference,
we may see legislators using this new route of bill introduction, as well as
groups and individuals with the financial or human resources to mount
successful petition campaigns. This development would be a new aspect of
hybrid democracy as the legislative agenda would be partially set by the
petition process, and strategic political actors would increasingly consider
this avenue of moving an issue to the forefront of policymakers' attention.
1. Time to Draft and Revise
The flexibility provided by the second reading stage of the framework
will result in better statutory and constitutional language. Currently, a
scrivener's error is sometimes identified during the petition circulation
period or during the campaign, and drafters would be eager to amend the
proposal to gain additional support if they had the ability to make such
changes. For example, Governor Schwarzenegger had to take a pension
reform initiative out of circulation in 2005 because the attorney general
interpreted his proposal not only as changing the structure of state
pensions, but also as abolishing death benefits for survivors of police
52.

COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1, cl. 5; COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-105(1) (2006) (requiring that a

hearing be held on each initiative submitted, before petitions are circulated).
53. DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE, supra note 25, at 102. See also WATERS, supra note 16, at 15
(detailing similar assistance provided in other states).
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officers and firefighters killed in the line of duty.54 Although the Governor
contested this interpretation as one adopted by a Democratic official
seeking to undermine his agenda, 55 the current structure of direct
democracy denied him the easy and uncontroversial response of just
changing the language to clarify that death benefits were protected.
Sometimes gaps in an initiative become apparent during the campaign;
under our framework, proponents could modify their proposals to address
such problems. For example, Proposition 71, the stem cell bond measure on
the California ballot in November 2004, arguably contained inadequate
conflict of interest and disclosure provisions. These concerns were raised
during the campaign, 56 providing the opportunity for amendment before the
popular vote. This example also demonstrates that a framework providing
this kind of flexibility may not solve all the problems of poorly worded or
inadequately comprehensive initiatives. In this case, Robert Klein, the main
force behind Proposition 71 and now Chair of the Independent Citizens
Oversight Committee of the California Institute for Regenerative Medicine,
has denied the need for such provisions. 57 Of course, if he had the chance
to make changes to respond to the concerns, he might have been willing to
do so. The position he has taken in the campaign and after his victory could
be a function of the inflexibility of the process and his desire to ensure that
the measure takes effect. Nonetheless, as with most framework laws, an
initiative framework would provide the opportunity for revision; it would
not require proponents to respond to all criticisms. It is important to leave
the decisions about changes to a ballot measure in the hands of the
proponents, even though they may resist beneficial changes. Empowering
state officials or legislators to change the language of an initiative
undermines the reason for direct democracy in the first place-to
circumvent entrenched political players who may be motivated by selfinterest or influenced by special interests at a cost to the public interest.
54. See Press Release, Cal. Sec'y of State, Secretary of State McPherson Reports Three Proposed
Initiatives Enter Circulation 2-3 (Apr. 4, 2005), http://www.ss.ca.gov/executive/press.releases/2005/
05_037.pdf (providing the attorney general's official title and summary of the "Prohibition Against
Defined Benefit Public Pensions. Exception for University of California. Initiative Constitutional
Amendment and Statute.").
55. See Robert Salladay, Lockyer Is Accused of Stacking Deck Against Initiatives, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 1, 2005, at Al.
56. See, e.g., Francis Fukuyama, Big Science, Big Giveaway, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2004, at A18;
Jonathan Knight, Critics Slate Ethical Leeway in California Stem-cell Proposal,NATURE, Sept. 16,

2004, at 232.
57. Klein has said that voters approved the initiative "with their eyes open" and that "[tihe
institute needs time to go through the process" and "have thoughtful due diligence." Bernadette Tansey,
Stem Cell Program in Limbo; Hayward Judge Reviewing Lawsuits that Block Research, S.F. CHRON.,
Nov. 18, 2005, at CI; Carl T. Hall, Stem Cells: The $3 Billion Bet, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 11, 2005, at A1.
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As advocates consider the best way to implement the policy objective,
they also have an opportunity to build support for their proposal by
involving other groups in the drafting. In this way, the initiative process
can incorporate some aspects of the traditional legislative process where
tradeoffs can be made and compromises can be reached. The scope of any
logrolling will be limited by both the breadth of the general policy
statement and the requirement that the text voted on by the people fairly fit
within the objectives it set out. We also envision that states will retain the
single subject requirement 58 under this new framework, a restriction that
further constrains the scope of negotiations and compromise.
The second reading stage promises other systemic benefits. More
drafting flexibility before the vote may reduce litigation after election day,
which often revolves around awkward wording. Moreover, the discussion
that will accompany the decision to amend an initiative's language and the
record from legislative hearings provides courts with helpful evidence to
interpret vague or ambiguous language in subsequent lawsuits.5 9 Requiring
a second reading in the initiative process may reduce the use of crypto60
initiatives for which policy change is at best a secondary consideration.
The need to negotiate with legislators before an initiative is actually placed
on the ballot may reduce the purely political use of initiatives. Also, the
information developed during this period can better inform those providing
fiscal analyses of the initiatives. Importantly, unlike the indirect initiative
in many states, the legislature cannot unilaterally deny proponents access to
the ballot by passing an alternative formulation. In our Dual Path Initiative
Framework, the proponents always have the option to put their reform on
the ballot, even if the legislature has responded with a statute or a
constitutional ballot measure.
2. A Formal Role for the Legislature
The second reading stage also formalizes an appropriate role for the
legislature in analyzing the policy, drafting legislative or constitutional
language, and negotiating with the supporters of the initiative. Mandatory
legislative hearings provide the avenue for the first two aspects of
58.

For a discussion of the single subject requirement in the context of initiatives, see Daniel H.

Lowenstein, Initiatives and the New Single Subject Rule, I ELECTION L.J. 35 (2002).
59.
For a discussion of how courts find "legislative intent" for initiatives, see Jane S. Schacter,
The Pursuitof "PopularIntent": Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107, 11423(1995).

60.

See Kousser & McCubbins, supra note 2, at 969-74 (discussing the rise oferypto-initiatives).

For a further discussion of the likely equilibrium after the adoption of the Dual Path Initiative
Framework, see Part V, infra.
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legislative activity and set the stage for negotiations if lawmakers are
interested in bargaining.
It is likely that at least some initiative advocates will be willing to
explore legislative alternatives because they currently use ballot measures
to gain leverage in the legislature. Initiative proponents often prefer to
avoid an election, which is costly and risky. Even if their change is
constitutional and thus necessitates a vote, ballot measures backed by the
legislature pass at significantly higher rates than do popular initiatives.6 1
Accordingly, initiative proponents hope that the credible threat of ballot
victory encourages legislative leaders to work out a mutually agreeable
compromise. Currently, if a compromise is reached before signatures have
to be filed with the California Secretary of State, there is no difficulty
because the supporters can decide not to turn the petitions in. The
complication arises when a compromise comes after the signatures have
been verified and the question certified for the ballot. In most states,
62
proponents cannot pull a question from the ballot once it is certified.
This inflexibility can cause confusion if the compromise requires the
legislature to submit a different but related question to the people. Then the
ballot contains two incompatible measures, and the parties to the deal have
to specify to voters which measure they should vote for and which one they
should ignore or vote against. In some cases, this message can be
successfully conveyed. For example, in 2004, Governor Schwarzenegger
hammered out an agreement with local government officials that allowed
him to get a budget through the legislature. In return for the local leaders'
support, the legislature put Proposition 1A on the ballot to amend the
Constitution to protect, somewhat, local governments' property tax and
sales tax proceeds from state raids in the future. 63 To increase the
61.
In California, 65% of legislative initiatives pass, while around a third of popular initiatives
succeed at the polls. Bruce E. Cain, Sara Ferejohn, Margarita Najar & Mary Walther, Constitutional
Change: Is It Too Easy to Amend Our State Constitution, in CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN CALIFORNIA,

supra note 24, at 265, 269. See also THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF
INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 197 (1989) (providing similar national figures); DAVID B.
MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 107

(1984) (providing voters' self-reported drop-off for ballot propositions by demographic category).
62. Most states limit the ability of proponents to withdraw the ballot measures after signatures
have been submitted or verified. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 34, § 8(A) (1999). South Dakota, however,
allows proponents to withdraw an initiative if the election is at least 120 days away, and if at least twothirds of the named sponsors request withdrawal, in writing, with the secretary of state. S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 2-1-2.2 (2003). See also COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-134 (2006) (allowing proponents to pull a
measure from the ballot no later than thirty-three days before the election).
63. See Tom Chomeau & Doug Haberman, Local Officials Seek End to State Raids on Funds,
PRESS ENTERPRISE, Oct. 25, 2004, at A6; Proposition 1A: Protection of Local Government Revenues,
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likelihood that the governor and legislators would deal with them, local
governments had already qualified Proposition 65 for the November ballot,
which would have much more severely limited the ability of the state to use
these revenues in an emergency. 64 Once a deal was reached, the local
governments dropped their support of Proposition 65 and joined the
campaign for Proposition 1A, but both measures still appeared on the ballot
65
in November.
In this case, the compromise passed and the initiative used as a threat
in the bargaining did not. But it surely would have been simpler and less
confusing had the supporters of Proposition 65 been allowed to remove that
measure from the ballot. If our framework had been in place, these
negotiations would have occurred in the second reading stage, and only the
compromise constitutional amendment would have appeared on the ballot.
When a statutory compromise is sufficient to satisfy all the parties, then
nothing needs to be taken to the people after a successful bargain.
The second reading stage encourages negotiation and compromise
with the legislature in other ways. Not only does the legislature necessarily
become involved as it conducts mandatory hearings on the proposal, but
also the legislature has leverage to encourage initiative supporters to deal
with it. Our framework permits both the legislature and the group
qualifying the policy to place initiatives on the same topic on the ballot. If
no mutually acceptable compromise is reached, then the legislature has the
right to place its own measure on the ballot. Our framework does not limit
the legislature to achieving policy goals identified in the statement that had
been circulated; rather, the legislature can put any initiative on the ballot, as
it can under current law. Thus, the legislature has the flexibility to achieve
the objective identified in the policy statement but in a different way-or to
achieve a different and perhaps incompatible objective. The state may use
its power to cause enough confusion to result in the defeat of both
proposals, or it may actually succeed in passing its ballot measure. The
reprinted in OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE: SUPPLEMENTAL 4-9 (Cal. Sec'y of State, 2004),

available at http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/bp nov04/supplemental/vig-sup-l a-entire.pdf.
64. See Proposition 65: Local Government Funds, Revenues. State Mandates. Initiative
Constitutional Amendment, reprinted in OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 10-15 (Cal. Sec'y of
State, 2004), available at http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/bp-nov04/supplemental/vig.sup-65entire.pdf (requiring voter approval for any reduction of local governments' vehicle license fee
revenues, sales tax revenues, or share of local property taxes).
65. See id. at 14-15 (providing no argument in favor of Proposition 65 and urging voters to pass
Proposition I A, "a new and better measure ... to prevent state raids on local government funding").
Proposition IA passed with 84% of the vote; Proposition 65 was handily defeated. CAL. SEC'Y OF
STATE, CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION, NOVEMBER 2, 2004, STATE BALLOT MEASURES, STATEWIDE
RETURNS (2004), availableat http://vote2004.ss.ca.gov/Returns/prop/00.htm.
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California legislature used this strategy in 2004 to defeat an initiative
proposing nonpartisan primaries. Instead, voters passed a legislatively
initiated ballot measure amending the constitution to allow political parties
control over their own primaries, essentially a codification of the status
quo.

66

Initiative proponents also have some clout in this bargaining game. As
we have noted, they can walk away from any bargain and take their
proposal directly to the people for enactment. If they choose that route and
succeed, then the CIIOC will play a role in the implementation of the
initiative. 67 If the legislature wishes to avoid the possibility of involvement
by the CIIOC in the future, then lawmakers will have to reach a deal that
proponents support. Thus, each side has reasons to bargain with the other,
and our framework changes the bargaining dynamics in significant ways
relative to the status quo. It also provides additional information to voters,
who can learn of the legislature's response to any initiative proposal.
Indeed, even the decision not to bargain or respond to the proposal beyond
68
the mandated hearings provides credible information to voters.
3. Certifying the Text for the Ballot
At the end of the second reading stage, when initiative sponsors
propose final text, the CIIOC will determine whether the text fits fairly
within the scope of the general policy that appeared on the petition. The
CIIOC has the option of certifying the initiative for the ballot, severing
provisions that are beyond the scope of the policy statement, or
disqualifying the entire initiative as inconsistent with the statement. There
should be expedited appeals of a CIIOC decision through the state courts.
We advocate this role for the CIIOC, and not the attorney general or
secretary of state who has similar responsibilities now, because a state
official, likely hostile to any initiative that has not been embraced by the
66. The legislature-sponsored proposal was Proposition 60, which was placed on the ballot to
react to Proposition 62, the nonpartisan primary initiative. See Proposition 60: Election Rights of
Political Parties. Legislative Constitutional Amendment, reprinted in OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION
GUIDE 16-19 (Cal. Sec'y of State, 2004), available at http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/bp-nov04/
prop_60_entire.pdf; Proposition 62: Elections. Primaries. Initiative Constitutional Amendment and
Statute, reprintedin OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 28-31 (Cal. Sec'y of State, 2004), available
at http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/bp-nov04/prop-62_entire.pdf. Proposition 60 passed overwhelmingly
with 68% of the vote, while Proposition 62 failed (only 46% in favor). CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, VOTES
FOR AND AGAINST STATEWIDE BALLOT MEASURES (2004), availableat http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/

sov/2004_general/sov-pref2 Ivotes for andagainst.pdf.
67. See infra Part IV (discussing the CIIOC).
68. See infra Part V (discussing the possible equilibrium outcome of no negotiation between
proponents and the legislature).
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established political actors, may not rule fairly on the ballot measures.
Current rules allowing the legislature to place initiatives on the ballot
would remain in place, so the legislature can put its own competing
proposal on the ballot in cases where no compromise is reached. In that
event, the CIIOC will provide a statement about how the legislative
proposal fits, if at all, with the goals of the original policy statement.
Our framework injects a new issue into any initiative campaign.
Opponents may argue that the version submitted to the voters diverges
from the policy statement that was circulated for signatures. This argument
may influence people to vote against the initiative either because it is not
what they originally supported or because this sort of strategic behavior
casts doubt on the motives and honesty of the proponents. Anticipating this
kind of attack, proponents are more likely to draft straightforward and
relatively clear text so that concerned voters can check the language and
assess the accuracy of campaign claims. Simplicity will not always be a
tactic available to proponents; some reforms are necessarily complicated.
But, on the whole, we expect that our framework will improve transparency
in the text of initiatives.
The bargaining during the second reading period may involve
logrolling between initiative supporters and legislators that, in some cases,
will result in deals that "buy off' the initiative supporters without
instituting meaningful reform along the lines described in the policy
statement. Some of these deals may be welfare-reducing for society as a
whole although beneficial to the leaders of the initiative drive. When such a
deal is embodied in a statute, there are no safeguards other than those in the
traditional legislative process to bring attention to the compromise.
However, when the deal requires a popular vote to enact it because it is part
of a constitutional change, the framework provides several protections.
First, in the description of a legislatively backed constitutional ballot
measure, the CIIOC should identify any side deal that deviates from the
purported policy objectives. This description, produced by an entity that is
not a party to any bargain, will make dubious compromises more
transparent to the press, opponents of the initiative, and voters. Second, as
described above, the campaign will likely include discussions of whether
the measure on the ballot is really the same reform that qualified during the
first stage of the framework. This dynamic makes it more difficult for
proponents to slip in special provisions benefiting them or their allies, or
for the legislature and proponents to include side deals in the text submitted
for a vote. Logrolling will certainly occur-as it occasionally does now in
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the initiative process 69-but our framework provides sufficient checks and
balances to make the deals salient to voters.
Even with these changes in the process of proposing and drafting

initiatives, we expect some to contain mistakes or to cause consequences
not fully understood when they were enacted. After all, even with many

vetogates, expert staff, and time for deliberation in the traditional
legislature, some statutes are poorly written, hastily conceived, and prone
to unanticipated consequences. 7 ° Thus, the third reading stage of our

framework focuses on the ability to revise popularly enacted laws and
constitutional amendments after they are passed.
C. THE THIRD READING: ALLOWING REVISION AFTER ENACTMENT

The issue of post-enactment change to initiatives must be resolved
differently for statutory initiatives and constitutional initiatives. In every
state that allows popularly generated constitutional amendments, a
subsequent popular vote is required to amend or repeal such an initiative.
Statutory initiatives, on the other hand, are more amenable to subsequent
revision. All states except California allow legislatures some latitude to

modify statutory initiatives; in California, statutory initiatives are insulated
from subsequent legislative involvement unless such involvement is
specifically authorized by the initiative itself.7' A few states prohibit repeal,

at least for the first few years the statutory initiative is effective. 7 Other
states require supermajority legislative votes to amend or repeal popularly
69. See Elizabeth Garrett & Daniel A. Smith, Veiled PoliticalActors and Campaign Disclosure
Laws in Direct Democracy, 4 ELECTION L.J. 295, 314-15 (2005) (describing logrolling engaged in by
Gerald Meral, president of the nonprofit Planning and Conservation League Foundation, in California,
to determine which projects would be included in a bond measure on the November 2002 ballot).
70. John Copeland Nagle observes that the legislature sometimes fails to take advantage of
vetogates in his interesting piece comparing initiatives with hastily enacted statutes. John Copeland
Nagle, Direct Democracy and Hastily Enacted Statutes, 1 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 163, 170-81
(1997). Certainly, we do not want to compare an ideal legislative process with a realistic, or even
cynical, view of direct democracy. But our point is that the legislative process provides checks and
balances-including the executive's veto power-that the initiative process simply lacks. Our goal is to
suggest additional checks for the latter process, in the hope that they will be used to improve policy but
with awareness that they will not be foolproof.
71. CAL. CONST. art. 1I, § 10(c) ("The Legislature may amend or repeal referendum statutes. It
may amend or repeal an initiative statute by another statute that becomes effective only when approved
by the electors unless the initiative statute permits amendment or repeal without their approval.").
72. See. e.g., NEV. CONST. art. 19, § 2, cl. 3 ("An initiative measure so approved by the voters
shall not be amended, annulled, repealed, set aside or suspended by the legislature within 3 years from
the date it takes effect."); WYO. CONST. art. 3, § 52(f) ("An initiated law ... may not be repealed by the
legislature within two (2) years of its effective date. It may be amended at any time.").
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enacted laws, 73 and Arizona requires that any amendment further the
purposes of the initiative and be passed by three-fourths votes in both
houses. 74 We will discuss the framework for statutory initiatives first and
then deal with the harder issue of revision of more durable constitutional
initiatives. Our focus is on initiatives that are placed on the ballot by
individuals and groups, not by the legislature. Legislatively backed
constitutional initiatives have navigated through the checks and balances in
the legislative process and thus do not require the additional check of the
third reading stage.
1. Statutory Initiatives
Under our proposed framework, some proposals for statutory changes
qualified in the first reading stage will never appear on the ballot because a
successful negotiation with the legislature culminates in the enactment of a
compromise through the traditional legislative process. Some proponents,
however, will not be satisfied with the legislature's response and will place
their statute on the ballot. Unlike the current regime in California, the
initiative framework should allow legislative repeal and amendment of
such statutory initiatives with the following limitations. First, repeal by
two-thirds vote of the legislature should be possible, but only after two
years of experience with the initiative. Second, a two-thirds vote of the
legislature should be required for amendments, which must further the
objectives of the popularly enacted law.
Some protection from the legislature is required; lawmakers can be
hostile to initiatives, which are often used to circumvent the traditional
process to enact policy. We thus allow repeal but limit amendments to
those consistent with the purpose of the law. This design better ensures
accountability for lawmakers who seek to undermine the statute. If they
want to negate the law, they must do so directly by repeal, not through
amendments that gut the proposal surreptitiously while still leaving it on
the books. This latter course of action is much more likely to occur without
the public's knowledge, whereas outright repeal is apt to be noticed.
73. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. 5, § I ("No measure approved by a vote of the people shall be
amended or repealed by the General Assembly ... except upon a yea and nay vote on roll call of twothirds of all the members elected to each house of the General Assembly .... "); N.D. CONST. art. 3, § 8
("A measure approved by the electors may not be repealed or amended by the legislative assembly for
seven years from its effective date, except by a two-thirds vote of the members elected to each house.").
74. See ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1, cl. 6(C); WATERS, supra note 16, at 27. Arizona also
prohibits repeal of an initiative by the legislature. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1, cl. 6(B).
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One problem with this solution is that supporters of the law must
remain vigilant in monitoring the amendments passed by the legislature and
challenging those they believe are inconsistent with the law's purposes.
Grassroots groups sponsoring an initiative often do not remain organized or
funded past the campaign, and even those that remain somewhat active
may not have the resources to mount judicial challenges. In this case,
money will remain influential because only those groups with long-term
organizations and sufficient funds will be able to protect their initiatives
from legislative meddling. We will suggest one solution to this problem
later: the CIIOC will keep track of legislative involvement with statutory
initiatives. It will also have standing to bring lawsuits to challenge
amendments that commissioners believe incompatible with the initiative's
purposes. We note that the oversight commission will focus only on
statutes passed through the initiative process, not on compromises enacted
through the legislature. The possibility of ongoing oversight may
encourage some reformers to pursue the initiative route if they fear
legislators and other state officials may not implement a compromise, and
the specter of oversight may encourage the legislature to offer an attractive
compromise to proponents.
2. Constitutional Initiatives
Currently, many initiatives are constitutional amendments and thus
cannot be changed by the legislature, but only by a subsequent popular
vote. If an initiative framework makes statutory initiatives more susceptible
to legislative tinkering, presumably the number of constitutional initiatives
relative to statutory ones will increase. Although constitutional initiatives
usually require more signatures for ballot access, few states require higher
voting thresholds to pass constitutional initiatives (a simple majority of
those voting is the typical requirement for enactment of any type of
initiative)., 5 Groups with sufficient resources find obtaining the additional
signatures relatively unproblematic, although more expensive, and thus
often choose the more durable constitutional route rather than the statutory
76
form, in states where they have a choice.
75. Nevada requires that initiative constitutional amendments pass by a majority vote in two
successive general elections. NEV. CONST. art. 19, § 2, cl. 4; WATERS, supra note 16, at 26. See also
INITIATIVE &
REFERENDUM
INST., REP. 2006-3,
CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENTS (2006),
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/REPORT%202006-3%2OAmendments.pdf (detailing other deviations
from the requirement of a simple majority to pass).
76. In states that allow both constitutional and statutory initiatives, there have been slightly more
statutory initiatives placed on the ballot through the petition process than constitutional initiatives. Data
from the Initiative and Referendum Almanac reveal that 703 constitutional amendments have appeared
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We propose that any constitutional initiative proposed entirely through
the petition process, rather than placed on the ballot by legislatures, should
require popular reauthorization after a certain period of time. Either the
legislature can resubmit the initiative to the people, or proponents can again
gather signatures to place it on the ballot for extension. Constitutional
provisions passed as initiatives should be subject to a one-time reapproval
after ten years. 77 Although this seems a relatively long period of time, we
believe at least a decade of experience is necessary for some initiatives to
produce a record necessary to evaluate them fairly. For example, initiatives
that affect structures of representation such as redistricting and campaign
finance reform must be in place for at least a decade or they will expire
before they can have any significant impact on governance. In addition,
there is a cost to reauthorizing initiatives. The framework applies to all
initiatives; therefore, even those that enhance welfare will expire and
require reenactment. Finally, a long enough period of implementation is
needed to encourage people to continue to use the initiative process; it is
not our intention to construct a framework that destroys direct democracy
by making initiatives so unattractive that no one will spend time qualifying
and passing them. Ten years is the period of time that we think balances the
costs and benefits of reduced durability.
Although one could argue that constitutional initiatives passed by a
landslide, say by three-fourths of those voting on the measure, should not
face reauthorization, Kousser and McCubbins's analysis suggests that
politicians construct some welfare-reducing initiatives to face little
opposition. Thus, these initiatives might be enacted by a substantial margin,
in an environment that undermines the ability of voters to vote
competently. 78 Therefore, no special treatment should be afforded to
initiatives on the basis of their popularity on election day.
For popular initiatives that expire and are not placed on the ballot by
the legislature for permanent enactment, fewer signatures will be required
for reauthorization to gain ballot access than were required initially.
Because part of the rationale for a one-time reauthorization requirement is
to allow constitutional initiatives to be modified to reflect experience with
the law, proponents will qualify for the reduced signature threshold even if
on the ballot in the eleven states that allow both direct constitutional and statutory initiatives, while 758
statutory amendments have qualified. This data covers the period from the beginning of the initiative
process in the United States through 2000. See WATERS, supra note 16, at 12 and passim.
77.
For a discussion of the effects of requiring traditional legislation to expire, including some
similar to those we discuss here in the context of initiatives, see Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary
Legislation, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007).
78.
Kousser & McCubbins, supra note 2, at 957-60.
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the measure is slightly different from the original enactment. This may
necessitate some judgment calls by the official certifying the petitions for
circulation, but the general rule should be that changes furthering the
purpose of the measure will be allowed without triggering the higher
signature thresholds. The process for placing the initiative on the ballot will
include the two reading periods described above to allow an opportunity for
evaluation of the experience with the provision and to encourage revisions
that improve its operation.
We anticipate many constitutional initiatives will be extended either
by legislative action or through requalification. Once a law has been in
effect, new interest groups often form as a result of the law, and they may
join the original supporters to advocate for reenactment. In addition, groups
will often work harder to retain a benefit than to obtain it in the first place.
But the one-time reauthorization allows for modification of the proposal to
adjust to developments that were unanticipated when the initiative was
passed or to account for changed circumstances. Moreover, proponents will
still need to convince a majority of voters to support the proposal again on
election day, even if the threshold for ballot access is somewhat reduced.
Once reauthorized, however, the initiative becomes permanent until
repealed by another initiative or constitutional revision.
IV. A FRAMEWORK FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
INITIATIVES: A CITIZENS OVERSIGHT COMMISSION
The checks and balances provided by our Dual Path Initiative
Framework do not explicitly address the concern that legislatures often
flaunt or simply ignore the mandates of an initiative. This is called the
"implementation problem," 79 and it occurs because initiative proponents
have to delegate to others the responsibility to implement and enforce the
initiative once it has been passed. Because the initiative process is a costly
way to circumvent the traditional lawmaking process, it tends to result in
policies that elected officials-often a large majority of them--do not like
or support.8" Otherwise, reformers would have used the route of traditional
lawmaking. Gerber, Lupia, and McCubbins identify two groups of postenactment actors vital to the initiative's success: "implementation leaders"
who provide instructions for compliance (for example, state legislators who
often must pass implementing legislation), and "implementation agents"
who carry out those directions (for example, bureaucrats who oversee the
79.
80.

Lupia & Matsusaka, supranote 1, at 475.
Gerber et al., The Politics ofImplementation, supra note 4, at 55-56.
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day-to-day governmental activities required by the initiative and any
subsequent instructions). 8 1 Not only are both these groups likely to be
hostile to the initiative's objectives, but also initiative supporters often
disband after their victory or lack the resources to monitor compliance and
sanction noncompliance. For greater compliance, we need to create a third
group-call them "implementation intervenors" 82 -whose interests are
more closely aligned with the proponents and the voters. We propose to
create such a group by establishing a statewide CIIOC.
A. DESIGN OF THE CIIOC
To reduce the ability of initiative leaders and agents to disregard
popular measures that the voters approve, we advocate establishing a
CIIOC, comprised of members appointed through the initiative process.
Each initiative will name a representative to the CIIOC, who will take
office if the measure passes. The primary role of the CIIOC will be to
oversee the actions of the implementation leaders and agents; provide
information on compliance with initiatives through hearings, press
conferences, and publications; and bring enforcement actions through the
courts and administrative procedures. It is first and foremost an oversight
mechanism, a component of a "fire alarm" network that will provide
information to the public about each initiative and its implementation. 83 It
is an additional intervenor designed to enhance the chances of
implementation; it will not replace current mechanisms like lawsuits, other
enforcement actions, and publicity resulting from the efforts of private
individuals or groups.
The CIIOC will have oversight jurisdiction with respect to initiatives
placed on the ballot by petition, but not with respect to measures put before
the people by the legislature, even if the original motivation was a petition
qualified during the first reading period of our framework. The rationale for
the CIIOC is that initiatives most likely to be resisted by implementation
leaders and agents need additional resources to ensure compliance; if the
81.
Id. at 47.
82. Cf Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures
as Instruments of Political Control,3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 264-66 (1987) (describing intervenors in
the legislative and administrative processes).
83. See Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked:
Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984) (arguing that "fire-alarm" oversight,
which involves little direct intervention by Congress into executive agency activities, is likely to be
more effective, on balance, than "police patrol" oversight, which is comparatively centralized, active,
and direct).
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measure was ultimately supported by the legislature, there is less
justification for this new form of oversight.
The CIIOC and its staff could play additional roles in the Dual Path
Initiative Framework. For example, we noted previously that the CIIOC
could determine whether the text of an initiative submitted to the voters
after the second reading period conformed to the policy statement that had
been qualified in the signature gathering stage. Additionally, the CIIOC
could release a statement describing how any measure placed on the ballot
by the legislature related to an earlier policy statement. There are other
opportunities to use the CIIOC, rather than an elected or appointed official
who may have a conflict of interest with respect to a ballot measure, to
make crucial decisions. The CIIOC could play a role in determining
whether a constitutional initiative submitted for popular reauthorization
after a decade of experience is sufficiently related to the previously enacted
initiative to be considered a reauthorization rather than a new policy.
Although the CIIOC provides an alternate decisionmaker to political actors
apt to be generally hostile to initiatives, the Commission should be used for
purposes other than oversight only when necessary. The oversight role will
demand significant attention and resources from the commissioners and
their staff, and it should remain the central focus of the CIIOC.
We are not aware of any similar initiative oversight commission with
jurisdiction over all popularly initiated ballot measures. Some statewide
and local initiatives establish oversight commissions with responsibilities
only with regard to the particular initiative creating them. For example, the
Political Reform Act enacted by statutory initiative in California in 1974
established the Fair Political Practices Commission ("FPPC") with five
members, appointed by the governor, attorney general, secretary of state,
and controller, to oversee and administer the Act. 8 4 The 2004 stem cell
initiative established a California Institute for Regenerative Medicine to
regulate research and to administer the grants. The twenty-nine members of
the Independent Citizen's Oversight Committee that runs the Institute are
appointed by various elected officials and the chancellors of some of the
University of California universities.8 5 Other states have similar initiativespecific oversight commissions, such as the Citizens Clean Elections
Commission established in Arizona as part of the public campaign
84.
85.

2006).

CAL. GOv'T CODE §§ 83100-83102 (West 2005).
CAL. CONST. art. XXxv, §§ 1-7; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 125290.10-20 (West
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financing system, 86 and the Citizens' Utility Board established by a 1932
87
initiative in Oregon.

Local initiatives also can create citizens commissions designed to
monitor compliance with the particular ballot measure. For example, an
initiative passed in Marin County, California in June 2006 established a
Citizens Oversight Commission to ensure that money from an education

bond was spent according to the terms of the ballot measure. The
Commission is appointed by the Board of Trustees of the school district,
however, undermining the proponents' claims that it would be independent.
These provisions of the ballot measure were explicitly designed to respond

to the implementation problem: the opponents' arguments against the
measure began with a recitation of past promises related to educational
88
infrastructure that politicians had repeatedly broken.

Some of these initiative-specific commissions also function as the
implementation leader or agent, such as the FPPC that promulgates

regulations and brings enforcement actions against those who violate ethics
or campaign rules. Others, such as the local oversight commission for the
education bond, are purely initiative intervenors charged with auditing the
behavior of leaders and agents and publicizing any noncompliance.
The CIIOC eliminates the need for separate oversight commissions at
the state level and replaces them with one well-staffed and permanent
commission. 89 Each statewide initiative will be required to name one
representative to serve on the CIIOC if the initiative is enacted. 90 This
86.
87.
88.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-955(A) (Supp. 2005).
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 774.010-990 (2005).
For the arguments that appeared in the Main county ballot pamphlet for and against this

measure, see MARIN REGISTRAR OF VOTERS, MEASURE STATEMENTS JUNE 6, 2006, REBUTrAL TO
ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF MEASURE A (2006), available at http://www.co.marin.ca.us/depts/
RV/main/Prime606O6/Measures/21-554.pdf, MARIN REGISTRAR OF VOTERS, MEASURE STATEMENTS

JUNE 6, 2006, ARGUMENT AGAINST MEASURE A (2006), available at http://www.co.marin.ca.us/depts/
RV/Main/Prime60606/Measures/21-555.pdf.
89. Initiatives might still set up initiative-specific agencies to implement the new policy; the
CIIOC does not eliminate the need for such administrative agencies. However, because many of these
are appointed by elected officials, the CIIOC should improve compliance in such cases because the
appointed officials may have preferences more aligned with those who appointed them than with the
voters or initiative proponents.
90. Thus, the number of commissioners will fluctuate as the number of initiatives fluctuates.
Commissioners will be part-time positions, with compensation for expenses and perhaps a very modest
honorarium. As initiatives conflict, so might the commissioners, but this conflict is just a reflection of
state politics and the decisions of the voters in passing conflicting initiatives. The commission then
provides another forum for these conflicts to be made public and explicit and to be brought to a
resolution. We object to a commission run by experts, such as former legislators or judges, who are
often part of the problem being addressed by an initiative. The commission may not need to meet very
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representative will serve one ten-year term in the case of constitutional
initiatives, or, in the case of statutory initiatives, one ten-year term or until
the initiative is repealed, whichever is shorter. Each initiative will also
name a group of potential replacements for the representative in case the
representative does not serve the full ten-year term. 9 1 The CIIOC will
randomly select from that group of replacements when the need to fill a
vacancy occurs. 92 If none of the replacements is willing to serve, or the
initiative fails to name replacements, then the vacancy will not be filled.9 3
This method of selection ensures that the interests of the commissioners
will be more aligned with the voters and proponents of the reform, allowing
their objectives to remain in play for at least a decade. It also avoids the
specter of elected officials nominating people to the commission who are
likely not to be sufficiently supportive of the popularly enacted laws and
constitutional amendments.
To establish the CIIOC immediately, members from current initiativespecific commissions will be randomly selected to serve terms staggered to
end as the CIIOC begins to be filled by representatives of initiatives passed
after its creation. Thus, in California, the CIIOC might first be formed with
a representative from the FPPC, the stem cell Independent Citizen's
Oversight Committee, the Children and Families First Commission, 94 and
often but should meet and publish reports on implementation each fall and will meet to approve the
language of new initiatives as needed. The commission should meet as often as needed by
circumstances and should have a budget large enough to allow a sufficient number of meetings. One
reader of an earlier draft worried that the CIIOC will encourage a new kind of crypto-initiative,
symbolic ballot measures designed only to pack the CIIOC with allies of a particular group or
movement. We think it unlikely that many would be willing to spend the resources necessary to qualify
and enact enough ballot measures to capture the CIIOC. We also anticipate that the reading periods in
the Dual Path Initiative Framework will work to reduce the number of crypto-initiatives, identify any
that are designed purely for questionable purposes, and publicize that aspect of any proposal. Moreover,
the legislature has the opportunity during the second reading period to co-opt a proposal and eliminate
the possibility of CIIOC involvement. Thus, although this sort of commission-packing behavior is
theoretically possible, we do not anticipate that it will occur much, if at all, in practice. Cf Christopher
S. Elmendorf, Representation Reinforcement Through Advisory Commissions: The Case of Election
Law, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1366, 1407-14 (2005) (discussing commission-packing in a related context).
91. Like the FPPC, commissioners would be removable by the governor, with the concurrence of
the Senate, for "substantial neglect of duty, gross misconduct in office, inability to discharge the powers
and duties of office ... after written notice and an opportunity for a reply." CAL. Gov'T CODE § 83105
(West 2005).
92. For a recent use of random selection as part of a political process, see George A. Papandreou,
Opinion, Picking Candidates by the Numbers, INT'L HERALD TRIB., June 8, 2006, at 8 (discussing how
Greece's Socialist Party revived the ancient Athenian practice of deliberative democracy to select its
candidates in municipal elections).
93. The ability to fill a vacancy on the commission reflects how much people care about the
implementation of an initiative.
94. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 130110 (West 2006).
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other similar initiative-created commissions that act in whole or in part as
implementation intervenors. After five to seven years, all these members
will have rotated off the CIIOC, replaced by representatives of newly
enacted initiatives.
The CIIOC will elect one member to serve as chair for a two-year
term; no chair can serve more than three terms. The commission will make
decisions by majority vote of the members present when there is a quorum
of a majority of eligible commissioners. A commissioner cannot also hold
any other elected or appointed political office at the federal, state, or local
level, although commissioners can participate in campaigns and other
partisan political activity. Commissioners will be subject to aggressive
disclosure laws so their political activities are publicized and any potential
conflicts of interest known. Recusal policies consistent with a citizens
oversight commission such as the CIIOC will be developed by the state's
political practices and ethics commission.
The CIIOC will employ an executive director, a legal counsel, a
director of communications, a director of research, a director of
information services and technology, and other appropriate professional
staff. The compensation and the budget will be tied to another state
administrative agency's budget, such as the Legislative Analysts Office,
and increased automatically according to the number of initiatives overseen
and by changes in the cost of living. This mechanism avoids the possibility
that the legislature will hamstring the CIIOC by denying it funding. Thus,
in California, the funding structure could be similar to the one governing
the FPPC: the FPPC chair is paid the same salary as the president of the
Public Utilities Commission, other commissioners receive a modest
honorarium for each day they are engaged in official duties,95 and the
budget of the FPPC is set by law and increases automatically by the cost of
living.

96

Although the CIIOC will be given enforcement authority beyond the
ability to hold hearings, it is not necessarily the case that it will bring
substantial numbers of lawsuits or other enforcement actions for at least
four reasons. First, legislators and bureaucrats will be aware of the CIIOC
and its power and will alter their behavior to take account of the increased
probability of sanctions. The CIIOC can threaten sanctions through
hearings and publicity, saving the possibility of more intrusive enforcement
actions if publicity is not sufficient to increase compliance. In other words,
95.

CAL. GOv'T CODE § 83106 (West 2005).

96.

Id. § 83122.
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the mere existence of the CIIOC will change the political game surrounding
initiative compliance, increasing the willingness of leaders and agents to
implement the initiative more fully. Although this threat may not be
sufficient to ensure complete compliance, few laws are fully enforced, and
the CIIOC may decide it is content with the level of enforcement that it
observes. This behavioral change will also be influenced by the increased
likelihood that citizens or interest groups will challenge lackadaisical
enforcement, encouraged by the information produced by the CIIOC
through hearings and reports.
Second, although the CIIOC will have a budget that cannot be
eliminated or reduced by lawmakers, it will not have an unlimited budget.
Thus, it will have to make choices about how to deploy resources. It will
have to prioritize, choosing only publicity as an enforcement method in
some cases, bringing lawsuits and other proceedings in others, and
choosing to do nothing in still others.
Third, the CIIOC will include a wide range of viewpoints among its
members. The members will have in common only their use of the
initiative process and will not necessarily share policy or other ideological
goals. Thus, any decision to pursue enforcement will be the result of
compromise among CIIOC commissioners, who will strike bargains and
make strategic decisions like any other collective entity in politics. This
requirement of collective action among relatively diverse members acts as
an internal check and balance on the activity of the CIIOC.
Finally, initiative sponsors, knowing that continuing oversight by the
CIIOC will occur, are likely to use more general language when they draft
initiatives than they do now because they will trust the CIIOC as their agent
more than they trust the legislature or bureaucrats. Vague language
increases the uncertainty about any outcome of litigation or agency
enforcement, a factor the CIIOC will take account of when deciding how to
deploy its resources. Of course, initiative sponsors can also predict this
effect and thus will presumably work in the second reading stage to
produce somewhat more specific language that will strengthen the position
of the CIIOC. The ability to specify fully, however, is limited for a variety
of reasons. 97 Thus, the CIIOC will nearly always face some possibility of
losing when it seeks to enforce its view of the initiative, and this will affect
its willingness to bring action in the first place.
97. For a discussion of the reasons initiatives use vague language now, see Gerber et al., The
Politicsof Implementation, supranote 4, at 58.
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We anticipate that the CLIOC will be popular with the voters. Various
kinds of citizens assemblies are an increasingly attractive solution to
political problems caused when entrenched political actors pursue their
self-interest at the expense of the public interest-or are perceived to be
doing so. For example, a Citizens' Assembly on Electoral Reform in
British Columbia, Canada, consisting of 160 citizens selected randomly
from the province's electoral districts, conducted fifty hearings on electoral
reform in 2004.98 With the help of an expert staff, these ordinary citizens
proposed changing the system of representation from first-past-the-post,
single-member districts to a single transferable vote system. 99 The proposal
was submitted to the people in a referendum. To pass, the referendum had
to receive both a supermajority of 60% of all those voting and a simple
majority in 60% of the seventy-nine electoral districts. The referendum
failed, but it only barely missed the threshold: it received over 57% support
and achieved a simple majority in all but two districts.' 00 A similar citizens
0
assembly has been proposed in California to consider election reform.' '
Although these citizens assemblies are law-proposing bodies and thus serve
a function different from the CIOC's, and their members are selected in
different ways, 10 2 such assemblies reflect the current enthusiasm for
mechanisms that facilitate increased citizen involvement in policymaking.
Moreover, they demonstrate the reality that institutional innovation is
necessary to deal with inevitable conflicts of interest when laws regulating
the political process would otherwise be crafted or implemented by those
active in the political process.
98.

See Keith Archer, Redefining Electoral Democracy in Canada, 3 ELECTION L.J. 545 (2004)

(examining the reform of Canada's electoral system as a case study in reforming political institutions).
The Citizens' Assembly website is http://www.citizensassembly.bc.ca/public

(last visited Dec. 21,

2006).
99.

See BRITISH COLUMBIA CITIZENS' ASSEMBLY ON ELECTORAL REFORM, supra note 10, at 3-

8.
100.
See FINAL REFERENDUM RESULTS: REFERENDUM ON ELECTORAL REFORM (2005), available
at http://www.elections.bc.ca/elections/ge2005/finalrefresults.htm.
101.
See Assemb. Const. Amend. 28, supra note 10 (dying in committee after being introduced by

Assembly Members Canciamilla and Richman). In addition, a citizens assembly is under consideration
in Ontario. See News Release, Office of the Premier, Ontarians to Have a Say on Electoral Reform

(Nov. 18, 2004), http://www.premier.gov.on.ca/news/Product.asp?ProductlD=251.
LEIB,

DELIBERATIVE

DEMOCRACY

IN AMERICA:

A PROPOSAL

See also ETHAN J.

FOR A POPULAR BRANCH

OF

GOVERNMENT (2004) (proposing an institution like a citizens assembly, a fourth, "popular," branch of
government in a creative proposal to make direct democracy more deliberative).
102. Although the CIIOC members are not selected by lot, as in the British Columbia Citizens'
Assembly, they are more like ordinary citizens than are legislators. Even in a world of term limits, most
legislators have extensive political experience and are more likely to be professional politicians than
citizen legislators. In contrast, CIIOC members cannot be elected or appointed politicians and will have
been selected through the mechanism of direct democracy.
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B. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CIIOC AS AN IMPLEMENTATION
INTERVENOR

In the most comprehensive analysis of the implementation problem,
Gerber, Lupia, McCubbins, and Kiewiet identify four conditions affecting
the degree of compliance with popular initiatives.1" 3 The CIIOC,
particularly as part of the larger Dual Path Initiative Framework, implicates
three of the four conditions and does so in ways that will result in fuller
compliance with the wishes of voters than occurs now.
First, lowering the technical and/or political costs of implementation
leads to greater compliance by a legislature. 104 Technical costs are affected
by the clarity of drafting an initiative because they include "the time and
monetary costs of having legislative staff determine how to implement
aspects of the initiative." '1 °5 The first and second reading periods should
reduce the technical costs of implementation and thereby increase the
probability of compliance. The CIIOC can tilt the balance of political costs
in favor of implementation, as well as positively affect technical costs of
monitoring mandated programs. Most initiative sponsors do not have the
financial resources to oversee the post-election process, and many disband
after the measure has passed. Thus, they currently find it difficult to impose
significant political costs on legislators for ignoring voter-passed
initiatives. An oversight commission, however, that provides "sunshine"
and has enforcement authority creates a greater chance that there will be
political costs for undermining voter-passed initiatives. By creating
political costs for failing to implement an initiative's dictates, oversight
helps to equalize the costs politicians face if they implement an initiative
that works against their self-interest and the costs of not following the
voters' wishes. To the extent that oversight shifts the balance toward
implementation, the oversight committee will have a positive effect on the
probability of implementation.
Second, an initiative is more likely to be implemented if those
supporting the measure can impose effective sanctions on initiative leaders
or agents who do not comply with the initiative.' 0 6 Currently, initiative
proponents have very limited sanctioning ability. 10 7 Under our proposal,
their power to punish recalcitrant politicians and bureaucrats is greatly
103.

See GERBER ET AL., STEALING THE INITIATIVE, supra note 4,at 15-25.

104.

Id. at 20.

105.

Id.

106.
107.

Id.at21.
See Gerber etal.,
The PoliticsofImplementation, supra note 4,at51-52.
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augmented. Initiative sponsors select who sits on the commission, and they
will choose agents who are likely to have common interests and push
forcefully for fuller implementation. The oversight commission will have
the ability to publicize the actions of the implementers through hearings,
publications, press conferences, and enforcement actions. By bringing
lawsuits and other proceedings, they can use the coercive power of the state
to increase compliance. Politicians are primarily concerned about
reelection; 108 if they anticipate that the information and attention created by
the oversight commission is likely to affect their reelection prospects, they
will exercise greater energy in policy implementation. Not all politicians
will change their behavior as a result of the additional publicity brought by
the CIIOC. Some represent districts that did not support the initiative and
thus face no electoral backlash;' 0 9 others will anticipate that different issues
will dominate any reelection campaign. However, the CIIOC will increase
the chance that failure to implement popular initiatives will result in some
punishment for some legislators on election day.
A third condition that increases compliance is the ability and
willingness of the public or others who support the initiative to observe the
actions of the legislature."10 For example, although initiatives imposing
legislative term limits are enormously unpopular with lawmakers
themselves, they are fully complied with because the failure to leave office
at the end of the term is easily observable. Even if the voters forget how
long a particular representative has served, the representative's challenger
and the press can bring the matter to the voters' attention.1 1' Term limits
are an unusual case; in most circumstances, voters and information
intermediaries face substantial difficulties in learning of the actions of
initiative leaders and agents. Our framework directly addresses this issue
by creating a standing entity with the resources to oversee implementation
and with the incentive to ensure fuller compliance. Importantly, the
technical staff and budget of the CIIOC will help to level the playing field
between the legislators and the public, thereby increasing compliance with
the initiative's dictates.
108.
This is the standard assumption in the legislation scholarship. See, e.g., DAVID R. MAYHEW,
CONGRESs: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 14-15 (1974) ("It seems fair to characterize the modem

Congress as an assembly of professional politicians spinning out political careers.").
109. See Daniel A. Smith, Homeward Bound? Micro-level Legislative Responsiveness to Ballot
Initiatives, I ST. POL. & POL'Y Q. 50, 56-57 (2001).
110. GERBER ET AL., STEALING THE INITIATIVE, supra note 4, at 22.

Ill. An additional factor in the success of the term limits initiatives is that they were backed by
several well-funded national organizations that did not disband after succeeding in passing the
measures. For a discussion of the term limits provision of California Proposition 140 of 1990, and the
implementation problem, see id. at 57-59.
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The fourth condition affecting implementation is the number of people
required for full compliance: as that number grows, the probability of full
compliance goes to zero. 112 The addition of an oversight commission does
not address this concern with implementation. Proponents concerned about
this factor, however, can use the time during the first two reading periods to
design legislation that minimizes the number of required participants. We
suspect, however, that reforms often require many agents to implement
them appropriately, so the ability of proponents to reduce the threat to their
measures by reducing the number of parties involved is limited.
Although the CIIOC, together with the Dual Path Initiative
Framework, is not a panacea for the problems associated with initiative
implementation, creating this sort of innovative oversight mechanism will
reduce problems with compliance. By improving the execution of initiative
policy, public policy will better represent the goals of citizens.
V. CONCLUSION: MORE THOUGHTS ON THE POLITICAL
EQUILIBRIUM AFTER ADOPTION OF THE DUAL PATH
INITIATIVE FRAMEWORK
Our previous discussion has suggested some aspects of the political
equilibrium that would result from adoption of our proposal. It is worth
noting briefly several other changes to the political landscape that we
expect. First, we do not anticipate that our reforms will significantly change
the balance between statutory and constitutional initiatives because we do
not alter the qualification requirements for either type of initiative.
Currently, initiative proponents with the choice use statutory initiatives
more than popularly generated constitutional amendments, even though
legislatures have the ability to amend and/or repeal statutory initiatives in
all states except California. 113 Adding new restrictions (mandatory
reauthorization after a decade of experience) to constitutional initiatives
will make popular constitutional change relatively less attractive than it is
now. So if there is any shift, it should favor increased use of the statutory
route, with the corresponding benefit of the possibility of legislative
involvement after enactment, allowing flexibility to change the policy over
time.
Second, the new equilibrium will result in a different number of
initiatives appearing on the ballot, although the direction of the change is
uncertain because there are several cross-cutting factors at play. Our
112.
113.

Id. at24.
See supra note 76.
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proposal is intended to give initiative proponents an opportunity to qualify
policy statements more easily than they can now qualify either type of
initiative. The policy statements are less complicated than the text of an
initiative, making them easier to sell to voters in a signature gathering drive
and reducing the costs for drafting them. Thus, we predict that more policy
statements will be qualified to move to the second reading period than are
currently qualified for the ballot now. Furthermore, the lower costs of
qualification (because there is no need to draft detailed text) will encourage
more small groups and grassroots efforts to pursue the initiative process
than do so in the current, more costly system. Although our proposal does
not reduce the power of money in the qualification stage, we do level the
playing field for those groups whom the inventors of direct democracy
hoped to empower: grassroots groups that are more likely to reflect
majoritarian preferences somehow blocked in the legislative process.
Countervailing forces, however, may discourage the expenditure of
money and effort on an initiative. The institutionalized possibility of
legislative action during the second reading stage makes any policy gains
less certain. Although proponents can still place the measure on the ballot
no matter what happens in the second reading stage-legislative action
does not foreclose this possibility-voters often defeat both proposals when
there are competing initiatives, and legislatively backed ballot measures
tend to succeed more than popularly generated ones. The combined effect
of more legislative involvement and reduced durability (through mandatory
reauthorizations for constitutional initiatives and legislative involvement in
statutory ones) will decrease the value of initiatives. By lowering the value
of an initiative, our reform should result in fewer initiatives on the ballot. In
other words, more policy statements may qualify, but fewer initiatives may
appear on the ballot, as proponents bargain with legislators more readily
under our proposed incentive structure. As we observed above, one way to
think of the first reading stage is as a new route of bill proposal in the
legislature.1 14

Of course, if the legislature does not bargain with proponents or create
policy in response to policy statements qualified during the first reading
period, then we expect there to be even more initiatives on the ballot, as
citizens and interest groups attempt to pass their preferred legislation.
Legislators may refuse to bargain for various reasons. They may want to
avoid any blame for a policy that fails (although for compromise
constitutional reforms, which require a vote of the people, some of the
114.

See supra Part II.B.
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blame will be shared by voters themselves). Lawmakers may be unable to
bargain successfully when government is divided and the parties are split
over the appropriate response strategy. The failure of the legislature to
engage directly with citizens in policy making may lead to electoral
consequences in the next election, however.
Another factor affecting the number of initiatives on the ballot is the
effect of the reapproval requirement for constitutional amendments, which
requires that supporters place them back on the ballot to remain effective.
We expect that most constitutional provisions will be requalified for the
ballot when they expire because the original proponents will be joined in
this effort by others who benefit from the law. This possibility may
encourage the legislature to bargain on a compromise, although the
willingness to bargain will be influenced by the likelihood of success at the
polls. Whether those initiatives that are requalified through the popular path
are enacted more easily than those appearing on the ballot in the first place
is unclear. Voters will have more information about the provisions that are
being resubmitted to them, a reality that may be positive or negative
depending on the information. While there may be additional beneficiaries
campaigning for passage, there may also be groups and people who have
concretely felt the costs of the law during the decade it has been in place,
and who will even more aggressively campaign for its defeat. Presumably,
after some experience, the bargaining dynamics will be shaped, and fewer
initiatives will actually be put before the people for reenactment either
because the legislature will eagerly bargain (if reenactment rates are high),
or proponents will not pay the costs of requalification and a new campaign
(if reenactment rates are low).
Third, although the analysis above suggests that initiatives will have
lower value to proponents because of their reduced durability, the CIIOC
will actually increase another aspect of the value of popular initiatives. The
CIIOC will ensure that initiatives enacted by the voters at the polls are
more fully implemented, at least until they expire, in the case of
constitutional initiatives, or are repealed by the legislature, in the case of
statutory measures (an action for which there may be electoral
consequences). If, in the end, this effect outweighs the former effects, and
more initiatives end up on the ballot because of the promise of citizen
oversight, at least they will have had three readings and a chance for
legislative involvement before they become the law. The role of the CIIOC
with respect to popularly generated initiatives will encourage the legislature
to bargain with initiative proponents because a compromise-whether
statutory or constitutional-will foreclose involvement by the independent
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group of citizen overseers. Proponents may be willing to give up the
protection of the CIIOC in return for permanent enactment of a
legislatively supported constitutional amendment or a statutory solution
that lawmakers are more likely to enforce since they played a role in its
design.
The equilibrium outcome under the new framework for initiativeswith its dual path process of three readings and the creation of the CIIOChinges in large part on how the legislature reacts to initiative proponents
during the second reading bargaining game. An active legislature will
reduce the number of initiatives under this scheme, but an inactive one will
increase, perhaps greatly, the number of initiatives, and representative
democracy will trend toward direct democracy within our hybrid system.
However, all of the initiatives will, ultimately, produce better policy under
this framework, given the addition of checks and balances into the process
and the greater probability of compliance. In short, this framework
promises substantial improvement to institutions of governance and the
policies they produce.
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